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CON STR UCTI NG A FRAM EWOR K FOR
CR I M I NAL J USTICE R E S EARCH: LEAR N I NG
FROM PACKE R’S M I STAKE S
Stuart Macdonald*
This article examines the framework which Herbert Packer devised for
analyzing the criminal justice process. Warning against an indiscriminate use
of the word “model”—something which Packer introduced, which critics of his
work have perpetuated, and which today is commonplace in criminal justice
research—it distinguishes three distinct tools which researchers might
employ—strong ideal types, weak ideal types and non-ideal types—and
underscores the importance of drawing a sharp distinction between empirical
work and evaluative work. Exposing other fundamental flaws in Packer’s
framework, the article also abstracts two other general lessons for criminal jus-
tice research: (1) arguing that a one-dimensional framework like Packer’s is
insufficient, it advances the normative claim that a multidimensional frame-
work is needed; and (2) it shows that Packer’s simplistic approach to the analy-
sis of values is ultimately inadequate. So as well as constructing a number of
tools which may be used by criminal justice researchers, and offering examples
of how they might be employed, the article establishes the general contours of
a framework for criminal justice research.
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I .  I NTROD UCTION
In August 1967 Professor Herbert Packer of Stanford University put aside
his administrative duties as vice provost, and went away to Santa Cruz to
concentrate his efforts on the book he was writing. The result was the
acclaimed The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,1 winner in 1970 of the
prestigious triennial Order of the Coif book award, the highest honor that
could be bestowed on an American legal scholar. While the book’s primary
concern was to question the “far too indiscriminate”2 way in which the
criminal sanction was being resorted to, it is best known for Packer’s two
models of the criminal justice process, the “crime control” and “due
process” models.3
This article begins, in part II, with a description of Packer’s models and
the “common ground” which Packer said exists between them. The final
section of part II provides an overview of the existing critiques of Packer’s
framework, and explains what this article seeks to add to this body of lit-
erature. Having shown that Packer’s intention was to construct two ideal-
types, and explained why he failed in this task, the article then attempts,
in part III, to succeed where Packer did not. This part of the article
accordingly constructs four ideal-types, based on the values of investiga-
tive efficiency, operational efficiency, and reliability. Part IV then turns to
the other values discussed by Packer—prevention of abuse of state power,
equality, and crime prevention. Emphasising the importance of distin-
guishing between empirical work and evaluation, the article explores the
implications of this distinction for those constructs founded upon these
three values. The article concludes, in part V, by abstracting from the dis-
cussion some general lessons for criminal justice research. As well as con-
structing a number of tools which may be used by criminal justice
researchers, and offering examples of how they might be employed, the
article thus aims to establish the general contours of a framework for crim-
inal justice research.
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1. Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968).
2. Id. at 364. For an outline of the central argument of the book, see infra note 129.
3. The part of the book expounding these models is almost identical to an earlier
article. See Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1
(1964).
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I I .  AN I NTROD UCTION TO PACKE R’S MOD E LS
A. The Crime Control and Due Process Models
According to the crime control model, the most important function of the
criminal process is to repress criminal conduct and thereby safeguard
social freedom. It insists that “primary attention be paid to the efficiency
with which the criminal process operates to screen suspects, determine
guilt, and secure appropriate dispositions of persons convicted of crime.”4
The model is founded upon the “presumption of guilt.”5 According to this
presumption “the screening processes operated by police and prosecutors
are reliable indicators of probable guilt,” and so suspects found to be prob-
ably guilty by these processes should be convicted “as expeditiously as pos-
sible . . . with a minimum of occasions for challenge, let alone post-audit.”6
The model thus finds in the presumption of guilt “a factual predicate for
the position that the dominant goal of repressing crime can be achieved
through highly summary processes without any great loss of efficiency.”7
Packer stated that if the crime control model resembles an assembly
line, the due process model resembles an obstacle course. The due
process model insists that reliability is of at least as much importance as
efficiency, and so “if efficiency demands short-cuts around reliability, then
absolute efficiency must be rejected.”8 The model regards investigative and
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4. Packer, supra note 1, at 158.
5. Packer explained that the presumption of guilt is not the opposite of the presumption
of innocence. The presumption of guilt “is purely and simply a prediction of outcome,”
whereas the presumption of innocence “is a direction to officials about how they are to pro-
ceed.” Packer, supra note 1, at 161. The presumption of innocence requires “that until there has
been an adjudication of guilt by an authority legally competent to make such an adjudication,
the suspect is to be treated, for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the probable
outcome of the case, as if his guilt is an open question.” Id. Note that Packer’s presumption
of guilt only applies where it would be “plainly absurd” to maintain that the suspect did not
commit the offense, such as where a person commits a murder in front of many witnesses and
confesses to the crime. It must therefore be distinguished from situations where an investiga-
tor suspects an individual is guilty of an offense and then seeks to gather admissible evidence
to substantiate his hunch. For a stark example of this ethos, see Williamson v. Reynolds, 904
F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla., 1995). Ron Williamson was prosecuted in Oklahoma for first degree
murder and spent eleven years on death row before finally being released in April 1999.
6. Packer, supra note 1, at 160.
7. Id. at 162.
8. Id. at 165.
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prosecutorial fact finding as prone to error, and so insists upon formal
fact-finding processes. But “this is only the beginning of the ideological
difference between the two models.”9 First, the due process model stresses
that “power is always subject to abuse,” and so “would accept with con-
siderable equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency with which
the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official oppres-
sion of the individual.”10 The doctrine of legal guilt “implements these
anti-authoritarian values” by holding that a person may only be held
liable for a crime if the finding of guilt was “made in procedurally regu-
lar fashion and by authorities acting within competences duly allocated
to them.”11 Second, the model asserts that the principle of equality
“imposes some kind of public obligation to ensure that financial inability
does not destroy the capacity of an accused to assert what may be meri-
torious challenges to the processes being invoked against him.”12 And
third, the model is sceptical “about the morality and utility of the crimi-
nal sanction,” which creates “pressure to limit the discretion with which
that power is exercised.”13
B. The Common Ground between the Crime Control and Due
Process Models
Packer’s analytical framework was constructed upon four assumptions,
which he described as “some common ground” between the two models.14
The first of these assumptions was that “the function of defining conduct
that may be treated as criminal is separate from and prior to the process
of identifying and dealing with persons as criminals.”15 He described this
as one side of the U.S. Constitution’s ex post facto clause coin. The second
assumption was the other side of this coin—“the criminal process ordi-
narily ought to be invoked by those charged with the responsibility for
doing so when it appears that a crime has been committed and there is a
| N E W C R I M I NAL  LAW R E VI E W | VOL .  11 | NO.  2 | SPR I NG 2008260
9. Id. at 165.
10. Id. at 166.
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id. at 169.
13. Id. at 170, 171.
14. Id. at 154–158.
15. Id. at 155.
NCLR1102_03.qxd  5/29/08  5:01 PM  Page 260
reasonable prospect of apprehending and convicting its perpetrator.”16 The
third assumption was that “a degree of scrutiny and control must be exer-
cised with respect to the activities of law enforcement officers, that the
security and privacy of the individual may not be invaded at will.”17 There
should be some limits to the powers of government to investigate and
apprehend persons suspected of committing crimes. The final assumption
was that “the alleged criminal is not merely an object to be acted upon but
an independent entity in the process who may, if he so desires, force the
operators of the process to demonstrate to an independent authority
(judge and jury) that he is guilty of the charges against him.”18 This
assumption encompasses such terms as “the adversary system,” “procedural
due process,” “notice and an opportunity to be heard” and “day in court.”
Packer explained that these assumptions could be “roughly equated with
minimal agreed limits expressed in the Constitution of the United States
and, more importantly, with unarticulated assumptions that can be per-
ceived to underlie those limits.”19 These assumptions reflect the fact that
Packer’s models were intended by him as tools for analysing a criminal
process which “operates within the framework of contemporary American
society.”20 They are not apt to be used to analyze criminal processes which
do not adhere to these premises.
It follows from this “common ground” that a sharp distinction must be
drawn between, on the one hand, prioritizing the values associated with
one of Packer’s models at the expense of the values associated with the
other model, and, on the other hand, a challenge to the assumptions that
the framework is constructed upon. Take the void for vagueness doctrine,
rooted in the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment (federal
statutes) and the Fourteenth Amendment (state statutes), as an example.21
It is not uncommon for researchers today to use Packer’s models loosely;
such a researcher might describe a law which fell foul of the void for vague-
ness doctrine as embodying crime control values. In fact, such a law would
challenge the first of the assumptions underlying Packer’s framework. In
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16. Id.
17. Id. at 156.
18. Id. at 157.
19. Id. at 155.
20. Id. at 154.
21. See, e.g., Lanzetta v New Jersey 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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the eyes of Packer’s framework, then, the law should be described not as
embodying crime control values, but as challenging the very framework
within which the American criminal process operates.
Unfortunately, however, Packer himself obscured the clarity of this dis-
tinction. He explained that in a criminal process which adheres to the four
assumptions outlined above, like the American one, two separate value
systems compete for priority. Each of his models represents the values
underlying one of these value systems “to the exclusion of all of the values
underlying the other.”22 He thus stated that “the models are polarities,”23
the crime control model insisting solely on the value of efficiency and the
due process model insisting only on the values of reliability, prevention of
abuse of state power and equality. These extreme positions exist at either
end of a spectrum:
As we examine the way the models operate in each successive stage [of the
criminal process], we will raise two further inquiries: first, where on a spec-
trum between the extremes represented by the two models do our pres-
ent practices seem approximately to fall; second, what appears to be the
direction and thrust of current and foreseeable trends along each such
spectrum?24
The framework Packer purported to create is thus clear. A policy deci-
sion which adheres to the four assumptions constituting the common
ground may be located on the spectrum between the crime control and
due process models. In this way trends may be analyzed and explicated.
But there is a problem with this framework. The assumptions underlying
it reflect what are, broadly speaking, rule of law concerns. They are thus
rooted in the liberal values which Packer attributed to the due process
model. Unsurprisingly, then, there is a tension between the so-called com-
mon ground and Packer’s statement that the crime control model insists
on the value of efficiency to the “exclusion” of the values underlying the
due process model. For example, according to the third of the assumptions
which Packer said underlies his framework there must be at least some
scrutiny and control of the activities of law enforcement officers in order
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22. Packer, supra note 1, at 154.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 153.
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to protect individuals’ security and privacy. This is contradicted by the
crime control model’s assertion that “[i]t is enough of a check on police
discretion to let the dictates of police efficiency determine under what cir-
cumstances and for how long a person may be stopped and held for inves-
tigation.”25 It seems that Packer sensed a problem here, simply stating,
oxymoronically, that “the polarity of the two models is not absolute.”26
This does not deal with the problem adequately. If the crime control
model insists on the value of efficiency to the exclusion of the values asso-
ciated with the due process model, Packer’s analytical framework implodes;
the model at one end of his spectrum challenges the very assumptions upon
which the spectrum is constructed. If, on the other hand, the crime con-
trol model’s insistence on efficiency is not to the outright exclusion of the
values associated with the due process model, the content of the crime con-
trol model becomes unclear. To what extent may the “common ground”
impinge on the crime control model’s insistence on efficiency? To what
extent may the dictates of efficiency be sacrificed so that the activities of law
enforcement officers can be scrutinized and controlled? Moreover, if
encroachments on the dictates of efficiency are countenanced, the crime
control and due process models can no longer be polar opposites at either
end of a spectrum of possibilities. So while the intended structure of
Packer’s analytical framework is clear enough, his failure to clearly distin-
guish the framework’s underlying assumptions from the values which oper-
ate within the framework means that ultimately the structure collapses.
C. Existing Critiques of Packer’s Framework
Packer’s framework has been subjected to considerable criticism. Broadly
speaking, these criticisms concern the purportedly dichotomous nature of
Packer’s framework, the framework’s undue selectivity, and Packer’s claim
that he had constructed “models.”
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25.  Id. at 177.
26. Id. at 154. Packer also stated that the ideology of the due process model “is not the
converse of that underlying the Crime Control Model.” Id. at 163. He immediately quali-
fied this statement by explaining that the due process model “does not rest on the idea that
it is not socially desirable to repress crime.” Id. This particular statement was thus intended
to convey nothing more than the fact that both models agree that the raison d’être of the
criminal justice process is to apprehend, convict, and sentence those who engage in con-
duct which has been defined as criminal. See infra part II.C.
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First, commentators have claimed that Packer’s framework presents a
false dichotomy. David Smith has argued that “the Crime Control Model
is concerned with the fundamental goal of the criminal justice system,
whereas the Due Process Model is concerned with setting limits to the
pursuit of that goal.”27 He accordingly claimed that it would be mistaken
“to evaluate a system of criminal justice purely by how closely it approxi-
mates to the Due Process Model.”28 Smith’s criticism usefully highlights
the obfuscatory effect of the title “crime control” model. It obscures the
distinction between the raison d’être of the criminal justice process (to
apprehend, convict, and sentence those who engage in conduct which has
been defined as criminal) and the values of efficiency, speed, and finality—
which concern one possible way in which the apprehension and convic-
tion of offenders might be pursued.29 But Smith’s assumption that the
crime control model is concerned with the first of these—the raison d’être
of the criminal justice process—was mistaken. That the crime control
model is in fact concerned with the way in which the apprehension and
conviction of offenders is pursued is confirmed by Packer’s analogies of an
assembly line and an obstacle course. The point about the assembly line is
not what product emerges at the end (a criminal conviction), but the
speed and efficiency with which that product is produced. To remedy this
confusion, Peter Duff has proposed renaming the crime control model the
“efficiency model.”30 As will be argued below, however, this new title
would itself be deeply problematic.
Malcolm Feeley has also doubted the dichotomous nature of Packer’s
framework—asserting the empirical irrelevance of due process in many
minor cases where “the cost of invoking one’s rights is frequently greater
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27. David J. Smith, Case Construction and the Goals of Criminal Process, 37 B.J.
Criminology 319, 335 (1997). See also Andrew Ashworth & Mike Redmayne, The Criminal
Process 39 (3d ed. 2005) (making a similar point).
28. Smith, supra note 27, at 336.
29. This distinction is recognized by other writers. Ashworth distinguished the “general
justifying aim” of criminal justice from principles and policies which qualify the pursuit of
that aim. A.J. Ashworth, Concepts of Criminal Justice [1979] Crim LR 412. See also Neil
Walker & Mark Telford, Designing Criminal Justice: The Northern Ireland System in
Comparative Perspective (Criminal Justice Review Group Research Report 18) (2000)
(proposing a two-tiered “meta-model” of the criminal justice process).
30. Peter Duff, 38 B.J. Criminololgy 611 (1998). Note that Smith subsequently refined
his analysis of Packer’s models. Smith, 38 B.J. Criminolology 616 (1998).
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than the loss of the rights themselves”31—as has Doreen McBarnet, who
argued that due process is in fact consistent with crime control: “the law
in action is only too close a parallel to the law in the books; due process is
for crime control.”32 McBarnet’s contention has, however, been described
as overstated by Andrew Rutherford, who, in his study of criminal justice
practitioners, found three “working credos.” The first included the belief
that “as few fetters as possible be placed upon the authorities in the pur-
suit of criminals who, when caught, should be dealt with in ways that are
punitive and degrading”; the prevailing concern of the second was “to dis-
pose of the tasks at hand as smoothly and efficiently as possible”; and the
third encapsulated “empathy with suspects, offenders, and the victims of
crime, optimism that constructive work can be done with offenders,
adherence to the rule of law so as to restrict state powers, and an insistence
on open and accountable procedures.”33
Rutherford’s account ties in with the second set of criticisms commen-
tators have leveled at Packer’s framework—that it is unduly selective. This led
Michael King to outline a further four models—the medical, bureaucratic,
status passage and power models.34 Packer has been particularly criticized for
neglecting the role played by resource management35 and victims’ rights.36
Although some have argued that these considerations only assumed
greater significance in the years since Packer wrote, so that Packer’s frame-
work in fact captured the prevailing concerns of the late 1960s, this seems
overly charitable given that Bottoms and McClean highlighted the role of
resource management only eight years after the publication of The Limits
of the Criminal Sanction.37 In his well-known recent critique of Packer’s
framework, meanwhile, Kent Roach has stated that it “cannot explain
why women, children, minorities, and crime victims claim rights to the
criminal sanction.”38 As a result Packer’s models cannot make sense of
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31. Malcolm Feeley, The Process is the Punishment 277 (1979).
32. Doreen McBarnet, False Dichotomies in Criminal Justice Research, in Criminal
Justice: Selected Readings 31 (Baldwin & Bottomley eds., 1978).
33. Andrew Rutherford, Criminal Justice and the Pursuit of Decency 11, 13, 18 (1993).
34. Michael King, The Framework of Criminal Justice ch. 2 (1981).
35. A.E. Bottoms & J.D. McClean, Defendants in the Criminal Process (1976).
36. Ashworth & Redmayne, supra note 27, at 38–40.
37. Id. at 39.
38. Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
671, 674 (1999).
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contemporary debates about pornography or hate speech, or of contem-
porary concerns about sexual and domestic violence against women and
children and hate crime against minorities, and so have become “as out of
date as other hits of the 1960s.”39 Seeking to utilize knowledge gained
from victimization studies completed since Packer’s work was published,
which demonstrate a widespread underreporting of crime, Roach
expounded two further models, the punitive (roller-coaster) and non-
punitive (circle) models of victims’ rights.
Third, Packer has been criticized for failing to explain the internal logic
of his models.40 John Griffiths has claimed that this failure leaves us with no
way of determining whether a particular value belongs more with one model
than the other.41 Griffiths attributes this failure to the fact that Packer did
not (contrary to his claim) succeed in constructing “models” of the criminal
process. The crime control and due process models, he explained, could not
have been intended to be “alternative ideals toward which one might strive”;
they are also not “entities which have an analogical or metaphoric relation-
ship to an actual system of criminal procedure.”42 Developing this, Griffiths
argued that the crime control and due process models share an underlying
assumption—that the criminal process is a struggle “between two contend-
ing forces whose interests are implacably hostile: the Individual (particularly,
the accused individual) and the State”43—and so therefore Packer only gave
us one model of the criminal process, the battle model. Starting from the
opposite assumption, one “of reconcilable—even mutually supportive—
interests, a state of love,”44 he then outlined a family model of the criminal
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39. Id. at 673.
40. Ashworth & Redmayne, supra note 27, at 40.
41. Griffiths says that Packer gives us no way to determine whether the value of effi-
ciency belongs more with the crime control model than the due process model, except that
he happens to assign it to the former. John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a
Third “Model” of the Criminal Process, 79 Yale L.J. 359 (1970). Similarly Ashworth &
Redmayne observe that although Packer ascribes the value of speed to the crime control
model, since delays are a source of anxiety, inconvenience, and potentially prolonged loss
of liberty, an emphasis on speed also belongs to the due process model. Ashworth &
Redmayne, supra note 27 at 40.
42. Griffiths, supra note 41, at 362 n.14.
43. Id. at 367.
44. Id. at 371.
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process in which the emphasis is on reconciling offenders, victims, and
their communities. Commenting that Griffiths “tells us very little about
the procedural arrangements which would be likely to flow from the adop-
tion of [the battle and family models],” Mirjan Damaska has asserted, in
his exposition of adversary and non-adversary models of the criminal
process, that what Griffiths “[seems] to have done” is to “present two pos-
sible ideological justifications” for these models.45 Meanwhile, according
to Damaska, Packer did not offer us two models of the criminal process;
instead he presented “a stimulating depiction, rich in implications, of two
clashing inner tendencies: the tendency toward efficiency and the tenden-
cy toward protecting the rights of the defendant.” The tension between
these tendencies “is part and parcel of the dialectics of any criminal
process.”46
A possibility which Griffiths did not consider, and which Damaska
rejected,47 is that Packer intended to construct “ideal-types” in the sense
outlined by Max Weber. Weber explained that ideal-types must be distin-
guished from ideals. Whereas an ideal is something against which one
evaluates reality, an ideal-type has “no connection at all with value-
judgments, and it has nothing to do with any type of perfection other than
a purely logical one.”48 An ideal-type is formed “by the one-sided accentu-
ation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many
diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly
CONSTR UCTI NG A FRAM EWOR K F OR CR I M I NAL J USTICE R ESEARCH | 267
45. Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506, 572–73 (1973). 
46. Id. at 576.
47. Damaska wrote: “Notwithstanding sporadic passages which seem to suggest the
contrary, closer reading reveals that [Packer] does not purport to contrast two rival ideal-
types in designing the criminal process.” Id. at 575. This is because, he claims, the due
process model is a negative model, and “it is conceptually impossible to imagine a crimi-
nal process whose dominant concern is a desire to protect the individual from public offi-
cials. In its pure form, it would lead not to an obstacle course, but rather to mere obstacles
and no course on which to place the former.” Id. Cf. infra part IV (discussing Jareborg’s
defensive model).
48. Max Weber, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in The
Methodology of the Social Sciences 49, 97–98 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch
trans. and eds., 1949).
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emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct,” and may be
used for both research and exposition:
Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the
extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from real-
ity, to what extent for example, the economic structure of a certain city is
to be classified as a “city-economy.” When carefully applied, these concepts
are particularly useful in research and exposition.49
The crime control and due process models were not meant as ideals;
Packer claimed that “a person who subscribed to all of the values underly-
ing one model to the exclusion of all of the values underlying the other
would be rightly viewed as a fanatic.”50 Rather they were intended to aid
analysis by providing “a convenient way to talk about the operation of a
process whose day-to-day functioning involves a constant series of minute
adjustments between the competing demands of two value systems.”51
Packer constructed the models by “[abstracting] two separate value sys-
tems that compete for priority in the operation of the criminal process”
and then imagining a value system that insisted wholeheartedly on one of
these sets of values, to the exclusion of the other.52 That Packer’s purpose
was to construct something like Weberian ideal-types is thus clear.
Ironically, Griffiths himself hinted at this possibility:
What [Packer] is really telling us is that among American lawyers there are
two main perspectives on the criminal process. He has caricatured them a
bit and exaggerated their differences so we can clearly see the terms of the
debate between those who hold more to one than to the other.53
This article argues that, while Packer’s aim may have been to create
ideal-types, he failed in this objective since he did not accentuate the rel-
evant features of the crime control and due process models to their purest
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49. Id. at 90.
50. Packer, supra note 1, at 154.
51. Id. at 153.
52. Id. Although the models were not intended to be taken in the sense of “Is and
Ought,” the values which Packer held dear are clear from his son’s book Blood of the
Liberals. George Packer, Blood of the Liberals (2000).
53. Griffiths, supra note 41, 362 n.14. See also Ashworth & Redmayne, supra note 27,
at 38.
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form. By remedying this error, and by correcting other flaws in Packer’s
work, part III of the article constructs four ideal-types based on the values
of investigative efficiency, operational efficiency, and reliability. In part IV
the article stresses the importance of the distinction between empirical
work and evaluation, and explores the implications of this distinction for
research tools constructed upon the values of prevention of abuse of state
power, equality, and crime prevention. The article seeks to demonstrate
the importance of drawing a sharp distinction between the different tools
which criminal justice researchers can employ. It also emphasizes the
importance of distinguishing between the distinct activities of empirical
work and evaluation. With these distinctions in mind, the article warns
against an indiscriminate use of the word “model.” This point is particu-
larly important given that Packer’s indiscriminate use of the word “model”
has been perpetuated by many of his critics, as the preceding brief
overview of the existing critiques of Packer’s work illustrates. Indeed, the
use of “models” is now commonplace in criminal justice research. As well
as advancing an alternative framework for criminal justice research—a
tabular summary of which can be found in the appendix to this article—
the article abstracts other general lessons for criminal justice research. It
argues that a one-dimensional framework like Packer’s is insufficient and
it illustrates the inadequacy of Packer’s simplistic analysis of values. So
while owing to the constraints of space, the article focuses on those values
which Packer attributed to one or the other of his two models, by estab-
lishing the general contours of a framework for criminal justice research it
paves the way for the development of further research tools founded upon
such values as resource management and victims’ rights.
I I I .  SUCCE E D I NG WH E R E PACKE R FAI LE D:  
CON STR UCTI NG I D EAL-TYPE S BAS E D ON TH E 
VALU E S OF ( I NVE STIGATIVE AN D OPE RATIONAL) 
E FFICI E NCY AN D R E LIAB I LITY
Having established that Packer’s objective was to construct Weberian
ideal-types of the criminal process, the aim of part III of this article is,
first, to explain that Packer failed in his objective since he did not accen-
tuate the relevant features of the crime control and due process models to
their purest form, and, second, to seek to achieve what Packer did not,
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by constructing ideal-types of the criminal process based on the values
of investigative efficiency, operational efficiency, and reliability. Before
constructing these ideal-types, however, it is necessary to do two things: to
distinguish three different ways in which Packer used the word “efficiency,”
and, first, to explain why, of the various values associated with the due
process model, this part of the article focuses on the value of reliability.
A. Reliability
One of the strands of thought underlying the due process model is a
skepticism about how the criminal sanction is used. Packer stated that
this skepticism leads in turn to concern about the criminal justice
process. However, since the range of possible concerns about the use of
the criminal sanction is so diverse, this strand of thought does not in
itself give us any guidance on what form the criminal justice process
should take.54 It simply acts as a catalyst for further evaluation. It is there-
fore not possible to construct an ideal-type with concern about the use of
the criminal sanction as a starting-point. This is not to say that concern
about the use of the criminal sanction is irrelevant. Not only might it
provoke consideration of the criminal justice process, it might also be rel-
evant in making the value judgments that the ideal-types open up. 
The other values which Packer attributed to the due process model—
reliability, prevention of abuse of state power, and equality—are different.
They are not contingent on how the criminal sanction is used. Each has a
substantive content and has something to say on what form the criminal
justice process should take. It is immediately apparent, however, that the
values of reliability, prevention of abuse of state power, and equality do not
always pull in the same direction. Take, for example, a confession,
obtained through torture of the suspect, but verified as true by evidence
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54. Packer was skeptical about the broadening use of the criminal sanction. He argued
that it was at odds with the movement of the criminal justice process towards the due
process model, and that a more refined approach to the criminal sanction was therefore
needed. See infra note 129. However, a person could be skeptical about the use of the crim-
inal sanction and not share Packer’s views. They might, for example, argue that there is lit-
tle point broadening the use of the criminal sanction unless the criminal justice process is
first streamlined, with fewer procedural safeguards.
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subsequently discovered as a result of the confession. If our sole concern
is reliability, the confession ought to be relevant evidence.55 But if we are
concerned purely with preventing abuses of state power, the confession
ought not to be considered as evidence. Refusing to consider such evidence
sends out a strong message that obtaining evidence in such a manner is
unacceptable.56 The due process model is thus constructed upon values
that may conflict.57 Although Packer recognized this, he seems to have
shied away from the inescapable upshot that a model which is internally
inconsistent is flawed.58 For this reason, this article considers the values of
reliability, prevention of abuse of state power, and equality separately.
At this stage a further distinction needs to be made. The ideal-types
constructed upon the values of prevention of abuse of state power and
equality have a normative content. The features of these ideal-types could,
in other words, be employed as evaluative tools and advanced for practi-
cal implementation. For this reason, they will be discussed in part IV,
when we turn to the distinction between empirical work and evaluation.
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55. Packer defined reliability as “a high degree of probability in each case that factual
guilt has been accurately determined.” Packer, supra note 1, at 164 (emphasis added). The
value of reliability thus requires that we look at every piece of evidence which helps deter-
mine factual guilt, including improperly obtained confessions that have been verified as
true. It is implicit in the distinction between factual and legal guilt that sometimes we
should sacrifice reliability and accept the possibility that a verdict is factually inaccurate in
order to, e.g., deter abuses of state power.
56. A confession obtained by torture is involuntary, and so may be excluded under the
Constitution’s due process clauses. It would also be inadmissible under the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
57. Although the example in the main text involves only two of the three values associ-
ated with the due process model, the same point applies if we take an example involving
equality. A defendant is convicted on the basis of incontrovertible evidence of his guilt, but
he did not have legal representation because he could not afford it. According to the dictates
of reliability there is no point in spending public money on providing legal representation for
a defendant whose guilt is not in doubt. But according to the dictates of equality, all defen-
dants should have access to legal representation regardless of their financial ability and the
cogency of the case against them.
58. Packer wrote: “the Due Process Model, although it may in the first instance be
addressed to the maintenance of reliable fact-finding techniques, comes eventually to incor-
porate prophylactic and deterrent rules that result in the release of the factually guilty even
in cases in which blotting out the illegality would still leave an adjudicative fact finder con-
vinced of the accused person’s guilt.” Packer, supra note 1, at 168. See also supra note 55.
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By contrast, of the four ideal-types we will construct upon the values of
investigative efficiency, operational efficiency, and reliability, three are
founded upon non-implementable premises which mean they could not
sensibly be advanced for practical implementation. Since Packer argued
that only a “fanatic” would insist wholeheartedly on the values of one of
his models to the exclusion of those of the other,59 this part of the article
will focus on these ideal-types.
B. Efficiency
As mentioned above, it has been suggested that the crime control model
should be renamed the “efficiency model.” However, this new title would
also be deeply problematic, because, as closer examination of Packer’s
work reveals, he used the word “efficiency” inconsistently. After attribut-
ing the value of efficiency to the crime control model he defined it as the
“expeditious handling of the large numbers of cases that the process
ingests.”60 However, as the following extract on the police’s power of arrest
demonstrates, this is not the only way in which Packer used it:
The innocent have nothing to fear. It is enough of a check on police 
discretion to let the dictates of police efficiency determine under what
circumstances and for how long a person may be stopped and held for
investigation.61
The fact that cases are dealt with expeditiously does not, in itself, afford
any guarantee to the innocent. Someone who has been wrongly accused
could have his case processed swiftly. The logic in this extract is that the
innocent have nothing to fear because the police are efficient at discover-
ing the truth. We may call this investigative efficiency (or alternatively
investigative effectiveness).62 Investigative efficiency is closely related to
the presumption of guilt:
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59. Packer, supra note 1, at 154.
60. Id. at 164.
61. Id. at 177.
62. The label investigative effectiveness perhaps conveys the essence of the concept
more clearly than the label investigative efficiency. Nonetheless, the term investigative effi-
ciency will be used in this article in order to maintain the connection with Packer’s work.
For a definition of investigative efficiency, we may employ Packer’s statement that “[b]y
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The presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to deal
efficiently with large numbers, as the Crime Control Model demands. The
supposition is that the screening processes operated by police and prosecu-
tors are reliable indicators of probable guilt.63
In this extract Packer uses the word efficiency to refer to the expeditious
handling of cases. We may call this second form of efficiency operational
efficiency. The extract also makes it clear that the crime control model’s
demand for operational efficiency is premised upon the reliability (or
investigative efficiency) of the police/prosecutorial screening processes.
In his outline of the due process model and its associated values,
Packer’s failure to recognize that he attributes different meanings to the
word efficiency becomes particularly glaring. This important section
begins with an explanation for the due process model’s rejection of admin-
istrative fact finding and its insistence on adjudicative fact finding. Having
defined reliability as “a high degree of probability in each case that factual
guilt has been accurately determined” and efficiency as the “expeditious
handling of the large numbers of cases that the process ingests,” i.e., oper-
ational efficiency, Packer then sought to illustrate the divergence between
the crime control and due process models by posing the question, “how
much reliability is compatible with efficiency?” He continued:
The Due Process Model insists on the prevention and elimination of mis-
takes to the extent possible; the Crime Control Model accepts the proba-
bility of mistakes up to the level at which they interfere with the goal of
repressing crime, either because too many guilty people are escaping or,
more subtly, because general awareness of the unreliability of the process
leads to a decrease in the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law. In this way,
reliability and efficiency are not polar opposites but rather complementary
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‘efficiency’ we mean the system’s capacity to apprehend, try, convict and dispose of a high
proportion of criminal offenders whose offenses become known.” Id. at 158. This differs
from Packer’s definition of reliability, in that he defined reliability as “a high degree of
probability in each case that factual guilt has been accurately determined,” whereas this def-
inition of investigative efficiency refers to convicting “a high proportion of criminal offend-
ers whose offences become known.” Id. at 164, 158. A lack of investigative efficiency will
thus result in a “justice gap.” The notion of a “justice gap” was influential in the change
that occurred in Dutch criminal justice policy in the 1980s. See Andrew Rutherford,
Transforming Criminal Policy ch. 3 (1996).
63. Packer, supra note 1, at 160.
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characteristics. The system is reliable because efficient; reliability becomes a
matter of independent concern only when it becomes so attenuated as to
impair efficiency.64
This quotation begins with a reaffirmation of the due process model’s
concern to ensure that the criminal justice process operates reliably. Packer
contrasts this with the crime control model, which also insists on reliabil-
ity, but to a lesser extent. Only if too many guilty people are escaping, or
if awareness of the unreliability of the criminal justice process is affecting
the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law, does the probability of mistakes
need to be addressed. He then states that, according to the crime control
model, reliability and efficiency are “complementary characteristics.” The
preceding expression “[i]n this way” reveals that what Packer means is that
if the criminal justice process is reliable, it will be efficient at deterring peo-
ple from crime. Packer then purports to restate this idea, saying that “the
system is reliable because efficient.” But the fact that a system is efficient
at deterring people from committing crime does not mean the system is
also reliable. Efficiency in this sense provides no guarantee of reliable fact
finding.65 Indeed only two sentences previously Packer stated the causal
relationship the other way around—“because general awareness of the
unreliability of the process leads to a decrease in the deterrent efficacy of
the criminal law.” Reliability is, however, the consequence of investigative
efficiency. If the criminal justice process is effective at discovering the
truth, reliable verdicts will inevitably ensue. So in order to make sense of
this statement we must conclude that Packer is switching to the investiga-
tive efficiency sense of efficient.
Packer then completes this sentence by stating that “reliability
becomes a matter of independent concern only when it becomes so
attenuated as to impair efficiency.” Since reliability is always of concern
to fact finders who possess investigative efficiency, Packer must here be
reverting to the idea expressed two sentences previously. For the crime
control model, reliability only becomes a matter of independent concern
when it is so attenuated as to impair the deterrent efficacy of the criminal
law.
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64. Id. at 164–65.
65. For example, individuals might be deterred from committing crimes by an onerous
penalty scale, even where the criminal justice process is unreliable.
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So although immediately before this passage Packer defined efficiency
in the sense of operational efficiency, at no point in the passage does he use
the word efficiency to refer to the expeditious handling of cases. Instead
he uses the word primarily to refer to the way in which the unreliability of
the criminal justice process will affect the efficiency with which individu-
als are deterred from committing crimes, while also lapsing into using the
word in the sense of investigative efficiency without offering any indica-
tion that he is doing so.
Having described the perspective of the crime control model, Packer
immediately goes on to say,
All of this the Due Process Model rejects. If efficiency demands short-cuts
around reliability, then absolute efficiency must be rejected. The aim of this
process is at least as much to protect the factually innocent as it is to con-
vict the factually guilty.66
What exactly does the due process model reject? Efficiently deterring
individuals from committing crime does not demand “short-cuts around
reliability”; on the contrary, as Packer has already pointed out, this form
of efficiency depends upon reliability. Neither does the due process model,
with its emphasis on reliability, reject investigative efficiency. Packer must,
of course, mean operational efficiency, i.e., according to the due process
model, if the expeditious handling of cases is incompatible with having
reliable fact-finding processes, then it is the expeditious handling of cases
that must be sacrificed. It is therefore misleading to say that “[a]ll of this
the Due Process Model rejects,” for it suggests that the due process model
is rejecting efficiency in the senses attributed immediately before to the
crime control model, when in fact it is only rejecting the primacy of oper-
ational efficiency.
Packer finishes this section by likening the due process model to a fac-
tory that cuts down on quantitative output in order to improve its quality
control. The implication is that the due process model chooses to sacrifice
the expeditious handling of cases in order to improve reliability, while the
crime control model insists on the expeditious handling of cases at the
expense of reliability. What Packer fails to recognize, however, is that the
crime control model does not demand “short-cuts around reliability”; on
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the contrary, as noted above, its demand for operational efficiency is
premised upon the reliability of the police/prosecutorial screening process.
Operational efficiency is only deemed to be a sustainable ideal because the
administrative fact-finding processes possess investigative efficiency. Packer’s
dialogue between the two models thus reveals two voices speaking at cross-
purposes: a crime control voice that fails to articulate its model clearly, and
a due process voice that has failed to understand the model of its opponent.
It is clear then that Packer’s analysis is confused as a result of his failure
to distinguish these three different forms of efficiency: investigative efficiency,
operational efficiency, and deterrent efficacy. So, as we turn to the task of
constructing ideal-types, it is imperative that these different forms of effi-
ciency are kept distinct.
C. The Investigative Efficiency and Operational Efficiency
Ideal-types
According to the crime control model, since police and prosecutors possess
investigative efficiency, “an early determination of probable innocence or
guilt emerges.” The model maintains that once those determined to be
“probably innocent are screened out,” those determined to be probably
guilty can be “passed quickly through the remaining stages of the process.”67
If there is confidence in the reliability of informal administrative fact-
finding activities that take place in the early stages of the criminal process,
the remaining stages of the process can be relatively perfunctory without
any loss in operating efficiency.68
This raises the question, when does the screening process end? As the
following passage shows, Packer saw the prosecutor’s decision whether or
not to prosecute as the final stage of the screening process:
[W]e will assume that the police have satisfied themselves that the original
decision to arrest was sound and that the suspect is factually guilty. . . . It
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67. Id. at 160.
68. Id. at 160–61. Packer again uses the word efficiency in a confusing manner. It
would not make sense for the word efficiency to be referring simply to the expeditious
handling of cases, since Packer’s logic here is based on efficiency also involving some
degree of reliability.
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is clear that now the initiative must pass from the police to the prosecutor,
from the expert in factual guilt to the expert in legal guilt. The decision to
be made at this stage is a screening decision: should the suspect be held for
further stages of the process?69
This passage also notes that, while the police are concerned with factual
guilt, prosecutors are concerned with legal guilt, and so will be swayed by
extra considerations, e.g., whether there is sufficient admissible evidence
to secure a verdict of guilty. So, according to the crime control model, all
those who emerge from the police/prosecutorial screening process and are
passed on to the remaining stages of the criminal justice process70 are likely
to be held to be legally guilty.
Having distinguished the police/prosecutorial screening process from
the remainder of the process, it is now possible to construct an investiga-
tive efficiency ideal-type of the police/prosecutorial screening process. The
starting point is the crime control model’s perspective on the reliability of
administrative fact finding:
[S]ubsequent processes, particularly those of a formal adjudicatory nature,
are unlikely to produce as reliable fact-finding as the expert administrative
process that precedes them. . . . It becomes important, then, to place as few
restrictions as possible on the character of the administrative fact-finding
processes and to limit restrictions to such as enhance reliability, excluding
those designed for other purposes.71
To construct the investigative efficiency ideal-type, the two key features
of this perspective must be accentuated to their purest form. So the first
feature of this ideal-type is that administrative fact finders have perfect
investigative efficiency. They will be completely reliable fact finders, and so
the innocent can be sure that their innocence will emerge.72 Furthermore,
since they have perfect investigative efficiency, administrative fact finders
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69. Id. at 205–06.
70. It is assumed here that the screening process comprises part of the criminal justice
process. An alternative approach would be to construe the criminal justice process nar-
rowly and hold that it begins only once the screening process is complete.
71. Id. at 162.
72. For example, on the issue of electronic surveillance, the crime control model states,
“Law-abiding citizens have nothing to fear.” Id. at 196. For a similar statement with regard
to the power of arrest, see supra note 61.
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will not waste time and effort employing their powers in a manner that is
not constructive. For example, they will not extract confessions by torture,
since such evidence is inherently unreliable. Neither will they waste time
pursuing personal agendas, for example, arresting and questioning some-
one simply because they have a personal vendetta against him.
The perfect investigative efficiency of the police is the basis for the second
feature of this ideal-type—that no restrictions be imposed upon the admin-
istrative fact-finding process. According to the crime control model,
“[c]riminal investigation is a search for truth, and anything that aids the
search should be encouraged.”73 Packer’s statement that “as few restrictions
as possible” be placed on the work of administrative fact finders failed to
reach the pure form of this perspective. Restrictions which conflict with the
demands of reliability will merely hinder the work of administrative fact
finders, while restrictions which “enhance reliability” are unnecessary since
the police (and prosecutors) have perfect investigative efficiency and there-
fore will, through self-regulation, impose such restrictions on themselves.
Since the investigative efficiency ideal-type only operates in the police/
prosecutorial screening process, a further ideal-type—which operates in
the post-screening part of the process—must also be constructed. This is
formed by accentuating the crime control model’s confidence in admin-
istrative fact finding and the model’s insistence on operational efficiency
in the post-screening part of the process to their purest forms. The result-
ant ideal-type, which we can call the operational efficiency ideal-type,74 is
thus premised on police and prosecutors having perfect investigative effi-
ciency. In other words, it presupposes that the police/prosecutorial
screening process is a perfectly reliable indicator of legal guilt, so that we
can say that everyone who emerges from the screening process is legally
guilty.75 As a result of this premise, the operational efficiency ideal-type
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73. Packer, supra note 1, at 189.
74. See Julia Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study (1995)
(advancing an operational efficiency model of prosecutorial sentencing). While this bears
some resemblance to our operational efficiency ideal-type, Fionda’s model bases its
demand for administrative efficiency on the pragmatic concern to “control and manage an
increasing workload within the constraints of a limited workforce and budget.” Id. at 176.
75. What this does not mean, of course, is that everyone who is factually and legally
guilty of a crime will emerge from the screening process, since not everyone who is factu-
ally guilty will be entered into the screening process in the first place.
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insists on operational efficiency in the remaining stages of the criminal
justice process. In its purest form, this requires that there be no delays in
resolving the case.
Examination of the operational efficiency ideal-type again reveals that
Packer failed to accentuate the key features of the crime control model to
their purest form. According to his presumption of guilt, those who
emerge from the screening process are only “probably guilty,”76 while the
remaining stages of the process are “relatively unimportant and should be
truncated as much as possible.”77 By contrast, the operational efficiency
ideal-type states that, since those who emerge from the screening process
are legally guilty, the remaining stages of the process need have no bearing
on the defendant’s guilt. All cases should therefore be dealt with as expe-
ditiously as possible, since all that remains to be determined is the sen-
tence to be served. The image of the conveyor belt thus resonates with the
operational efficiency ideal-type. Once a defendant has been placed on the
conveyor belt (i.e., been determined by the screening process to be legally
guilty), his case should be processed and disposed of as quickly as possi-
ble. What use would any obstacles on the conveyor belt be? His guilt is
not in doubt.
D. The Administrative Reliability Ideal-type
Turning our attention to the value of reliability, the next task is to con-
struct an administrative reliability ideal-type of the police/prosecutorial
screening process. Taking as its starting point the importance the due
process model purportedly attaches to the value of reliability, this ideal-
type maintains that the police/prosecutorial screening process should be
entirely devoted to achieving reliable determinations of legal guilt. Where the
value of reliability conflicts with other values, the conflict must be resolved
by meeting the demands of reliability. Prohibitions should be imposed to
prevent the police from engaging in activities that will not result in pro-
bative evidence being uncovered (e.g., extracting confessions by torture).
Conversely, no restrictions should be imposed upon activities that will
result in probative evidence being uncovered. If, for example, bugging a
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76. Packer, supra note 1, at 160.
77. Id. at 163.
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suspect’s telephone line is likely to result in cogent evidence being uncov-
ered, there should be no restrictions placed on the police’s power to do so.
The primary goal is for the screening process to reach the correct outcome,
and fetters should not be imposed on the pursuit of this goal.
Comparing the investigative efficiency and administrative reliability
ideal-types reveals certain differences between the two. The investigative
efficiency ideal-type is premised upon administrative fact finders having
perfect investigative efficiency, while the administrative reliability ideal-
type is not—it simply attaches primacy to the value of reliability.78 The
administrative reliability ideal-type consequently insists that the work of
administrative fact finders be regulated, so that they are prohibited from
engaging in activities that will not enhance reliability, and are directed into
activities that do. According to the investigative efficiency ideal-type, on
the other hand, it is unnecessary to regulate the work of administrative
fact finders, since the dictates of perfect investigative efficiency mean that
they are self-regulating. In spite of these differences, however, the two
ideal-types share the same underlying assumption. Both regard reliability
as of primary importance, and subjugate competing concerns to the
demands of reliability. For example, any electronic surveillance that pro-
duces probative evidence, and helps secure reliable determinations of
guilt, would be endorsed by them, regardless of issues of personal privacy.
As a result of this shared underlying assumption, the scope of the powers
of administrative fact finders is identical in each ideal-type. Although the
scope of these powers is determined by external regulation in one, and by
self-regulation in the other, the boundaries are the same.
It might seem surprising that there is such a high degree of similarity
between these two ideal-types, given that one was formed by accentuating
the crime control model’s perspective on the police/prosecutorial screen-
ing process, and the other was formed using one of the values at the heart
of the due process model. The explanation lies in Packer’s failure to
explain clearly the role of the value of reliability in his two models. Using
| N E W C R I M I NAL  LAW R E VI E W | VOL .  11 | NO.  2 | SPR I NG 2008280
78. The investigative efficiency ideal-type is thus an ideal-type in the strong sense since
its premise means it could not sensibly be advanced for practical implementation. By con-
trast, since the administrative reliability ideal-type is not constructed upon such a premise,
its features could theoretically form part of an agenda for practical implementation and it
is therefore an ideal-type in the weak sense. See also infra part IV.
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the factory illustration he implied that the due process model sacrifices the
expeditious handling of cases for the sake of reliability, while the crime
control model insists on the expeditious handling of cases at the expense
of reliability. But while reliability is of concern to the due process model
in the post-screening part of the criminal justice process, in the screening
process itself the model is pessimistic about the possibility of reliable
determinations of guilt—it rejects “informal fact-finding processes as
definitive of factual guilt” and adopts “a view of informal, nonadjudicative fact
finding that stresses the possibility of error”79—and so as a result attaches
greater significance to other concerns. Instead, it is the crime control model,
with its insistence that administrative fact finders should be allowed to
employ their expertise unhindered, that attaches great significance to the
value of reliability in the screening process. This is confused by Packer’s sim-
ple ascription of the value of reliability to the due process model.
E. The Adversarial Reliability Ideal-type
Having constructed an ideal-type of the police/prosecutorial screening
process based on the value of reliability, the next task is to construct an
ideal-type based on the value of reliability which operates in the post-
screening part of the process. The starting point for this is the due process
model’s skepticism about the reliability of the police/prosecutorial screen-
ing process. But, as we accentuate this view to its purest form, we find a
problem with the meaning of the word reliable. If we take reliability in the
sense of accuracy (consistently with Packer’s definition)80 and accentuate
this to its purest form, we have a screening process that is perfectly inac-
curate. Everyone who is innocent will be found by the screening process
to be guilty, and vice versa. This leaves two possible scenarios. Either
everyone who is passed on to the remainder of the criminal justice process,
having been found by the screening process to be guilty, would have to be
acquitted, or only those found by the screening process to be innocent
should be passed on to the remainder of the process. Neither of these pos-
sibilities are worthy of further consideration; the first would result in no
crime ever resulting in a conviction, while the second would result in a far-
cical criminal justice process.
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However, the word reliable may also be taken in the sense of trustwor-
thy. In fact, when Packer described the due process model’s perspective on
the police/prosecutorial screening process, he used reliability primarily in
the sense of trustworthiness.81 The proponent of the due process model
stresses the possibility of error and so all determinations made by adminis-
trative fact finders must be examined and reconsidered. If we accentuate
this to its purest form, we have a screening process that is entirely untrust-
worthy. The people who emerge from the screening process are regarded
as nothing more than a randomly selected group of people. The fact they
have been selected by the screening process offers no indication of guilt.
So in order to describe the due process model’s rejection of administrative
fact finding, it is important to take reliability in the sense of trustworthi-
ness. This is consistent with Packer’s depiction of the due process model.
However, Packer obscured this because he consistently defined reliability
in the sense of accuracy.
It is now possible to construct an adversarial reliability ideal-type of the
post-screening part of the criminal process. Packer wrote that the due
process model “resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part of
its input to quality control.”82 Again, he failed to accentuate this to its
purest form. According to the adversarial reliability ideal-type, the police/
prosecutorial screening process is completely untrustworthy, so emphasizing
the expeditious handling of cases is no longer appropriate.83 The post-
screening part of the process must be entirely devoted to scrutinizing
and testing the case against the defendant in order to achieve reliable
determinations of legal guilt.84
Comparing the administrative and adversarial reliability ideal-types
further illustrates Packer’s failure to explain clearly the role of the value of
reliability in his two models. One would have expected these ideal-types
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81. For example, he wrote of “the distrust of fact-finding processes that animates the
Due Process Model,” and he explained that the model’s “rationale [for excluding improp-
erly obtained confession evidence] is not that the confession is untrustworthy. . . .” Packer,
supra note 1, at 164, 191.
82. Id. at 165.
83. Of course, this is not to give a license for delay. But this is very different from the
ideal-type operational efficiency model’s emphasis on passing the case through the remain-
der of the criminal justice process as quickly as possible. Cf. supra note 41.
84. Here the accuracy and trustworthy senses of reliability coincide.
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to be complementary, since both were constructed upon the same value—
reliability. But in fact the two make uneasy bedfellows. While the adminis-
trative reliability ideal-type endorses the wholehearted pursuit by adminis-
trative fact finders of reliable outcomes, the adversarial reliability ideal-type
premises its insistence on securing reliable outcomes in the post-screening
part of the criminal justice process on the untrustworthiness of the
police/prosecutorial screening process. The adversarial reliability ideal-
type thus rejects the possibility of reliable administrative fact finding,
while the administrative reliability ideal-type embraces it. 
Closer examination of Packer’s application of the due process model to
the police/prosecutorial screening process confirms that, in spite of his
statement that the value of reliability is central to the due process model,
reliability has little role to play in the due process model’s perspective on
the police/prosecutorial screening process. Packer’s outline of the due
process model’s perspective on arrests for investigation,85 detention, and
interrogation after a “lawful” arrest,86 electronic surveillance,87 illegally
secured evidence,88 access to counsel,89 and the decision to charge90 is
instead dominated by a desire to protect privacy and the dignity and invi-
olability of the individual, and a concern to prevent the state from abusing
its power. For example,91 when describing the due process model’s perspec-
tive on arrests for investigation, Packer stated that a stringent test must be
satisfied before any arrest is made. This is based on a concern not to
“[open] the door to the possibility of grave abuse,” and to protect “per-
sonal privacy” and “the dignity and inviolability of the individual.”92
Similarly, on the issue of electronic surveillance, Packer stated that “the
right of privacy . . . cannot be forced to give way to the asserted exigencies
of law enforcement.”93 And third, when considering access to counsel, he
CONSTR UCTI NG A FRAM EWOR K F OR CR I M I NAL J USTICE R ESEARCH | 283
85. Packer, supra note 1, at 179–81.
86. Id. at 190–92.
87. Id. at 196–97.
88. Id. at 200.
89. Id. at 203.
90. Id. at 207–09.
91. The same is true of Packer’s description of the due process model’s perspective on
detention and interrogation after a lawful arrest, id. at 190–92, illegally secured evidence,
id. at 200, and on the decision to charge, id. at 207–09.
92. Id. at 179.
93. Id. at 196.
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said that the suspect must be immediately apprised of his right to remain
silent and to have a lawyer, he must promptly be given access to a lawyer,
and failing the presence of a lawyer he must not be subjected to police
interrogation, for “there is no moment in the criminal process when the
disparity in resources between the state and the accused is greater than at
the moment of arrest. There is every opportunity for overreaching and
abuse on the part of the police.”94 Indeed, where these concerns conflict
with the value of reliability, they are to be given priority, so, for example,
the due process model insists that improperly obtained confessions and
illegally secured evidence should be inadmissible regardless of their proba-
tiveness.95 So although Packer attributed the value of reliability to the due
process model, it is clear that, in the police/prosecutorial screening
process, the model attaches greater significance to competing concerns.
Packer thus obscured the role that reliability has to play by simultaneously
attributing it to the due process model and subordinating it to other con-
cerns in his application of this model, without offering any explanation of
his reasons for doing so. What is more, the due process model actually
rejects the possibility of administrative fact finders arriving at reliable
determinations of guilt:
People are notoriously poor observers of disturbing events—the more
emotion-arousing the context, the greater the possibility that recollection
will be incorrect; confessions and admissions by persons in police custody
may be induced by physical or psychological coercion so that the police end
up hearing what the suspect thinks they want to hear rather than the truth;
witnesses may be animated by a bias or interest that no one would trouble
to discover except one specially charged with protecting the interests of the
accused (as the police are not).96
It is incoherent to attribute the value of reliability to the due process
model and then to apply the model to administrative fact finding, if the
model’s insistence on reliability is premised upon the impossibility of
administrative fact finders arriving at reliable determinations of guilt.
Applying the model, with its insistence on reliability, to administrative
fact finding must either be futile, for the model itself asserts that reliable
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94. Id. at 203.
95. See supra note 55.
96. Packer, supra note 1, at 163.
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administrative fact finding is impossible, or, if it is not futile, the very
premise on which the model bases its demand for reliability in the post-
screening part of the criminal justice process is challenged. 
F. Using These Ideal-types: An Example
Having constructed these ideal-types of the criminal process, it is now
possible to offer an example of how they might be used. Packer ascribed a
uniform threshold of probability to the word reliability.97 In reality, how-
ever, parties at different stages of the criminal justice process are asked to
make quite different assessments of a case. A prosecutor, for example, may
only decide to charge a suspect if the charge is supported by probable
cause.98 Finders of fact in criminal trials, by contrast, employ the consti-
tutionally required standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”99 The “prob-
able cause” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” thresholds are obviously not
synonymous.100 Given the lower threshold applied by prosecutors, it fol-
lows that suspects may be required to stand trial when in fact the case
against them does not fulfill the criminal standard of proof. Suppose that,
against this background, the government directed the courts to speed up
criminal trials in order to ensure a swifter turnover of cases (with the
resourcing of the courts remaining the same).
Packer used the image of a factory to imply that the crime control
model sacrifices reliability in order to process cases expeditiously, while the
due process model insists on ensuring reliable determinations of guilt at
the expense of operational efficiency. As was explained previously, this
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97. He defined reliability as “a high degree of probability in each case that factual guilt
has been accurately determined.” Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
98. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function
and Defense Function, standard 3–3.9 (3d ed. 1993).
99. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
1o0. Although Packer ascribed a uniform threshold of probability to the value of relia-
bility, he did implicitly recognize that prosecutors apply a lower threshold than the crimi-
nal standard of proof, but without considering the implications this has for his models.
Packer, supra note 1, at 160. Note also that it is not only prosecutors and finders of fact in
criminal trials that have to make assessments of a case. The police must make an assess-
ment of a case when deciding whether or not to exercise their power of arrest. For exam-
ple, an officer may arrest without a warrant a suspect whom he has reasonable cause to
believe has committed a felony.
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contrast is flawed. Both models only recognize the expeditious handling of
cases to the extent that this is compatible with the dictates of reliability.
However, in reality there will often be instances where the demands of
operational efficiency and reliability conflict. Comparing such situations
to each of our ideal-types aids analysis of these situations and helps clarify
discussion. In our example, for instance, the government has shown a
concern to promote the expeditious handling of cases. This is akin to the
emphasis placed on operational efficiency by the operational efficiency
ideal-type. Unlike this construct, however, the background to the govern-
ment’s decision is a screening process that is not an effective indicator of
legal guilt. Furthermore, if the resources available to the courts remain the
same, then in order to ensure a swifter turnover of cases, the scrutiny with
which cases are examined must be reduced. The government has thus
decided to reduce the thoroughness of the adversarial fact-finding process,
even though the background to our example is similar to the premise
upon which the adversarial reliability ideal-type is built. Of course, one
would have to take into account the factors behind the government’s deci-
sion. Perhaps it was motivated by a concern to reduce the length of time
individuals are remanded in custody pending trial, or perhaps it wanted to
send out a message that they are cracking down on crime. In order to eval-
uate the decision these background factors would have to be considered.
The key point, however, is to note how the operational efficiency and
adversarial reliability ideal-types open up this further evaluative discourse.
If we compare this methodological approach to the one advocated by
Packer, the shortcomings of his proposed analytical framework are further
exposed. Packer encouraged the use of a spectrum, with his crime control
and due process models (purportedly) at either end. On this approach, our
example is simply an instance of the crime control model’s concern for the
expeditious handling of cases being given preeminence over the values under-
lying the due process model. There are two problems with this reasoning.
First, it fails to question whether the reliability of the criminal justice process
has in fact been diminished. Instead of examining the reliability of the
police/prosecutorial screening process, it simply assumes that the post-
screening part of the process ought to be devoted to reliability. Second, by
reducing all decisions to a simple conflict between the values of the
crime control and due process models, Packer’s framework offers only
one possible explanation for reducing the reliability of the post-
screening part of the process—to increase the expeditiousness with
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which cases are handled—when in fact other values might have formed
the basis for the decision. For example, the reliability of the post-screening
part of the process might have been reduced in order to try and deter
abuses of state power101—a possibility which Packer implicitly rejected by
attributing the value of prevention of abuse of state power to the same
model as the value of reliability. Packer’s proposed framework is thus inad-
equate for proper consideration of the issues involved.
IV.  TH E N E E D TO D I STI NG U I S H E M PI R ICAL WOR K
FROM EVALUATION
Of the ideal-types constructed in part III of this article, three were founded
upon premises which mean that they could not sensibly form part of an
agenda for practical implementation.102 They may thus be described as ideal-
types in a strong sense.103 They are theoretical constructs which are non-
implementable and which could not be regarded as prescriptions of what
ought to exist.104 As we turn our attention in this part of the article to the val-
ues of prevention of abuse of state power, equality, and crime prevention, we
will find an important difference with the tools which we will construct using
these values. For, as well as being useful in empirical work, we will find that
the features of these tools might also be advanced as evaluative standards. 
At first glance this possibility seems to blur the distinction, outlined in
part II above, which Weber drew between ideal-types and ideals:
[W]e should emphasise that the idea of an ethical imperative, of a “model”
of what “ought” to exist is to be carefully distinguished from the analytical
construct, which is “ideal” in the strictly logical sense of the term.105
CONSTR UCTI NG A FRAM EWOR K F OR CR I M I NAL J USTICE R ESEARCH | 287
101. See supra note 55.
1o2. The exception is the administrative reliability ideal-type. See supra note 78.
1o3. The word “ideal” is here being used in the abstract theoretical sense, not the ethi-
cal imperative sense. See infra note 105.
1o4. Note that while an ideal-type in the strong sense could not be regarded as a pre-
scription of what ought to exist, it might be plausible to use it to describe an ideal. Weber
gave the concept of a free market as an example of an ideal-type. Weber, supra note 48, at 90.
A perfectly free market cannot be achieved, but moving towards a free market might
nonetheless be described as an ideal.
1o5. Id. at 91–92. The distinction Weber draws here between the abstract theoretical and
ethical imperative senses of the word “ideal” is also found in the Oxford English
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Weber himself commented that writers often do blur the distinction
between the two.106 Using the example of Christianity, he claimed that
ostensibly ideal-types often “contain what, from the point of view of the
expositor, should be and what to him is ‘essential’ in Christianity because it
is enduringly valuable. . . . In this sense, however, the ‘ideas’ are naturally
no longer purely logical auxiliary devices, no longer concepts with which
reality is compared, but ideals by which it is evaluatively judged.”107 He
concluded:
[T]he elementary duty of scientific self-control and the only way to avoid seri-
ous and foolish blunders requires a sharp, precise distinction between the
logically comparative analysis of reality by ideal-types in the logical sense and
the value-judgment of reality on the basis of ideals.108
The crucial point that emerges from this is that a researcher should not
confuse the two distinct activities of empirical work and evaluation. On
this reasoning, however, it remains possible that a theoretical construct
may, if appropriate, be used both as an ideal-type when engaged in an
empirical study, and as an ideal when engaged in evaluative work—a point
which is confirmed by Weber’s recognition that such constructs may
sometimes, perhaps unwittingly, be “ideal-types not only in the logical
sense but also in the practical sense.”109 Before using such a construct as an
evaluative tool, however, it is important to heed Weber’s warning that a
failure to distinguish between “the ‘idea’ in the sense of the ideal [and] the
‘idea’ in the sense of the ‘ideal-type’ . . . on the one hand hampers the
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Dictionary’s entry for “ideal.” Strand B.2 of the definition states that an ideal is
“Something existing only as a mental conception,” whereas strand B.1.a. states that an ideal
is “an object to be realized or aimed at.” Oxford English Dictionary 615–16 (2d ed. 1989).
The terms “ideal-type” and “non-ideal-type” use the word in the abstract theoretical sense.
See supra note 103, infra note 118.
1o6. Weber wrote: “As fundamental as this distinction is in principle, the confusion of
these two basically different meanings of the term ‘idea’ appears with extraordinary fre-
quency in historical writings.” Weber, supra note 48, at 98.
1o7. Id. at 97–98.
1o8. Id. at 98.
1o9. Id. at 97. Weber stated that an ideal-type is a “mental construct [that] cannot be
found empirically anywhere in reality.” Id. at 90. It follows that if a weak ideal-type is used
in evaluative work as a prescription of what ought to exist, and is realized, then it must
cease to be an ideal-type (in the abstract theoretical sense).
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value-judgment and on the other, strives to free itself from the responsi-
bility for its own judgment.”110 So, if the constructs founded upon the val-
ues of prevention of abuse of state power, equality, and crime prevention
are to be used as evaluative tools, it is essential that such use first of all be
justified. To fail to do this would be to replace reasoned argument with
mere assertion and so result in an impoverished evaluation.
With this in mind, this part of the article discusses the use of research
tools founded upon the values of prevention of abuse of state power,
equality, and crime prevention in empirical and evaluative work. In par-
ticular, it explores the implications of Weber’s warning for the use of these
constructs in evaluative work. First, though, it introduces the work of
Swedish scholar Nils Jareborg, which at first glance bears some superficial
resemblance to Packer’s analytical framework.
A. Jareborg’s Defensive Model of, and Offensive Approach to,
Criminal Law Policy
Swedish scholar Nils Jareborg has outlined a defensive model of, and an
offensive approach to, criminal law policy.111 Unlike Packer’s due process
model, the defensive model is based purely on the concepts of prevention
of abuse of state power and the primacy of the individual. Jareborg
described the model as “an ‘ideal type’ model in a Weberian sense.”112 It con-
sists of principles for criminalization (respect for which means the criminal
code lists a set of “socially sanctioned basic moral demands” and so acquires
a “value-expressive function”), procedural safeguards, and principles for sen-
tencing (which recognize that “the courts cannot have an independent func-
tion in ‘combatting’ crime”).113 The offensive approach, meanwhile, is not a
conceptual construct, and so is not an ideal-type.114 Rather, it is an attempt
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110. Id. at 98.
111. Nils Jareborg, What Kind of Criminal Law Do We Want?, in Beware of
Punishment: On the Utility and Futility of Criminal Law 17 (Anikka Snare ed. 1995).
112. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 22–23.
114. Jareborg also insisted that the offensive approach ought not to be regarded as a
model, because “important parts of the defensive model are kept or only slightly modified—
there is no general rejection of the anchorage in a Rechtstaat ideology. . . . [I]t is not (yet)
possible to formulate an offensive model, i.e., to describe the offensive approach in isolation
from the defensive model.” Jareborg, supra note 111, at 24.
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to describe a “strong ideological counter-current” which “is undermining
[the] dominance” of the ideology of the defensive model.115 This emerging
attitude to criminal law policy “regards the criminal justice system as an at
least potential repertoire of methods for solution of social or societal prob-
lems”116 and so is “best described in terms of its methods and conse-
quences.”117 The offensive approach is thus an attempt to characterize a
particular strategy towards criminal justice, which adopts a mixture of pre-
vailing attitudes and some ideological leaning, without achieving a level of
coherent articulation found in a theorist’s model. It is a type of approach
to criminal justice, but a non-ideal-type.118
The offensive approach’s benevolent view of state power contrasts with
the perspective of the defensive model:
All criminal law aims at protecting the interests of individuals, collective or
public interests, or state interests, by using threats of punishment and by
using execution of punishment to make the threat credible. But the defen-
sive model . . . also aims at protecting individuals against power abuse, against
abuse of state power, excessive repression in legal or illegal forms, as well as
against abuse of private, informal power, of which “lynch justice” is the
most obvious form. . . . [T]he defensive model does not deny that the crim-
inal law has a social task or function, but its criminal law policy implies that
criminal law is meant to be an obstacle, not only for offenders, but also for
authorities and politicians.119
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115. Id. at 23.
116. Id. at 24–25.
117. Id. at 26.
118. Weber distinguished two senses of the word “ideal,” one a strictly logical sense, the
other an ethical imperative sense. See supra note 105. The expression “non-ideal-type” uses
the first sense of the word. Since Jareborg’s offensive approach to criminal law policy was
an attempt to describe a “strong ideological counter-current,” it may be regarded by some
as an ethical imperative. But it is a description of an emerging attitude, not a conceptual
construct, and so is not “ideal” in the abstract theoretical sense.
119. Jareborg, supra note 111, at 21, 24. Cameron argues that “the emphasis in the Swedish
system is placed on preventive, legislative safeguards on abuse of rights,” later attributing this
in part to the fact that the “courts in Sweden . . . unreservedly accept the primacy of the prin-
ciple of parliamentary democracy.” Iain Cameron, Protection of Constitutional Rights in
Sweden [1997] P.L. 488, 502, 504. It might be argued that this emphasis on preventive, leg-
islative safeguards informs Jareborg’s defensive model. The model asserts, for example, that
“the point of having a criminal justice system as a response to unwanted behaviour is . . . to
protect the offending individual from power abuse.” Jareborg, supra note 111, at 24.
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As this extract indicates, the defensive model “does not regard state
power as necessarily benevolent.”120 It sees the state itself as a “potential
enemy,”121 hence its concern to impose obstacles “for authorities and
politicians.” The defensive model and offensive approach’s contrasting
views of state power mean that Jareborg’s framework has a wider ambit
than Packer’s. It encompasses the work of legislators as well as the work of the
executive. For example, one of the principles for criminalization insisted
upon by the defensive model is that crimes must be defined by statutory
law and that the definitions must be understandable and determinate,
whereas one of the methods of the offensive approach is the use of lin-
guistically indeterminate definitions of crimes. This contrasts with
Packer’s framework, which focuses on the stages of the criminal process
from initial arrest through to appeals and collateral attack, and the poten-
tial for individuals involved in the process to abuse the powers vested in
them.122 As explained previously, his framework would not regard a lin-
guistically indeterminate crime definition as a contest between the values
of the crime control and due process models. It would be considered a chal-
lenge to the assumptions upon which the framework is constructed. In
other words, elements of Jareborg’s defensive model comprise the rule of
law concerns at the heart of the so-called common ground between Packer’s
models. The offensive approach to criminal law policy challenges these.
B. Prevention of Abuse of State Power
Packer’s attribution of the value of prevention of abuse of state power to
the due process model was based on the fact that the criminal justice
process is “coercive, restricting, and demeaning” and that criminal
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120. Jareborg, supra note 111, at 22.
121. Id. at 25.
122. For example, the due process model stresses the scope for police officers to abuse
their power of arrest and employ it in a discriminatory manner. Packer, supra note 1, at
179–81. It stresses the possibility of suspects being detained and interrogated improperly.
Id. at 190–92. It worries that “an unscrupulous policeman or prosecutor” could use elec-
tronic surveillance “to pry into the private lives of people almost at will.” Id. at 196–97. It
stresses that police officers might resort to illegal searches in order to obtain evidence. Id
at 200. And it states that a prosecutor “with nobody looking over his shoulder” might
charge a suspect even when there is insufficient evidence. Id. at 207–09.
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penalties are the “heaviest deprivation that government can inflict on
the individual.”123 Closely related to the value of prevention of abuse of
state power is the concept of the primacy of the individual.124 According
to this concept, the state should act in a manner that respects the auton-
omy, liberty, and rights of every individual. When it abuses its power it
violates these demands.
In part III we saw that much of Packer’s application of the due process
model to the police/prosecutorial screening process centers on preventing
abuses of state power. The same is true of the post-screening part of the
process. For example, the model insists that since “a person accused of
crime is not a criminal,” it is an abuse of state power to detain an accused
person pending trial unless the orderly processes of criminal justice are
under threat.125 On the issue of guilty pleas the model states that “no kind
of pressure, either by the prosecutor or by the judge, should be brought to
bear on a defendant to induce him to plead guilty. . . . [I]t can only defeat
the ends of the system to penalize a defendant for insisting on a trial.”126
And on the issue of appeals, the model urges that “the discretion to allow
bail pending appeal not be manipulated coercively to discourage the pur-
suit of any appeal that has a semblance of merit.”127 Moreover, an appeal
should result in the reversal of a conviction whenever an organ of the state
has abused its powers—“When an appellate court finds it necessary to cas-
tigate the conduct of the police, the prosecutor, or the trial court, but fails
to reverse a conviction, it simply breeds disrespect for the very standards
it is trying to affirm.”128
The features of the due process model which are based on the value of
prevention of abuse of state power may be used as an ideal-type to analyze
and expound trends in the criminal justice process, in the same way as
Jareborg’s defensive model. In fact, with each issue he considered (pre-trial
detention, guilty pleas, appeals, etc.), Packer compared the contempora-
neous situation in the United States with the perspectives of the crime
control and due process models, and concluded that the criminal justice
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123. Id. at 165–66.
124. Id. at 165.
125. Id. at 214–18.
126. Id. at 223–25.
127. Id. at 231.
128. Id. at 230–32.
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process was moving increasingly towards the due process model—an
important stepping stone in the argument of his book.129 However, in con-
trast to the investigative efficiency, operational efficiency, and adversarial
reliability ideal-types constructed in part III, Jareborg’s defensive model
and the features of the due process model which are based on the value of
prevention of abuse of state power could also be regarded as prescriptions
of what ought to exist, and so could be used as evaluative tools.130 The due
process model, for example, states that a prosecutor should never take the
lead in proposing or suggesting a compromise plea, for this could place
coercive pressure on an accused person, while Jareborg’s defensive model
insists that all persons accused of crime should be provided with access to
independent legal counsel. These are normative standards. The defensive
model and, to the extent it is based on the value of prevention of abuse of
state power, the due process model are thus ideal-types in a weak sense.
They are ideal-types which may also be used as ideals.
As explained above, if the defensive model or the features of the due
process model based on the value of prevention of abuse of state power
were to be used in evaluative work, such use would first have to be justi-
fied. This is especially important given that the defensive and due process
models’ concerns about abuses of state power are grounded in a liberal
outlook—the ideological base of the defensive model is classical criminal
law and the philosophies of the Enlightenment and its views on human
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129. Id. at 239. This conclusion, at the end of part two, paved the way for the ulti-
mate argument of the book. In part three Packer went on to argue that the criminal
sanction was being resorted to too indiscriminately, which created the situation where
“its processes are being forced to conform to values that reduce its efficiency [while] we
place heavier and heavier demands on those processes.” Id. at 365. Packer thus con-
cluded, “The process cannot function effectively unless the subject matter with which
it deals is appropriately shaped to take advantage of its strengths and to minimize its
weaknesses. The prospect of spending billions of dollars . . . on improving the capacity
of the nation’s system of criminal justice to deal with gamblers, narcotics addicts, pros-
titutes, homosexuals, abortionists, and other producers and consumers of illegal goods
and services would be seen for the absurdity that it is if we were not so inured to simi-
lar spectacles. Our national talent runs much more to how-to-do-it than to what-to-do.
We sorely need to redress the balance, to ask ‘what’ and ‘why’ before we ask ‘how.’” Id.
at 366.
130. Indeed, immediately after stating that the defensive model is an ideal-type, Jareborg
added that “[i]n many respects, it is also meant to be ‘ideal.’” Jareborg, supra note 111,
at 20.
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nature,131 while the due process model’s concern about abuse of state power
stemmed from the U.S. Constitution,132 the civil rights movement,133 and
the Warren Court of the day134—which many might not share. Jareborg’s
offensive approach usefully outlines another possible approach to criminal
justice:
From its point of view, the most serious criticism is not that the system is,
in some respects, unjust or lacking in legal certainty but that it is too inef-
ficient, not “rational” enough (in the sense of “goal rational”). Prevention of
harm or wrong-doing is the dominating perspective. . . . [F]or the defen-
sive model the state is a potential enemy. For the offensive approach, the
state is an ally. The possibility of power abuse is not completely forgotten:
a Rechtsstaat ideology is still the background. But the important thing is to
show results. . . . From its own point of view, the offensive approach is legit-
imate only if it is efficient in preventing crime.135
It would be misleading to suggest that goal fulfillment is the sole
domain of the offensive approach. For while a proponent of the offensive
approach may prioritize crime prevention, and so might criticize the crim-
inal justice process if it is not “efficient in preventing crime,” proponents
of the defensive model believe that the criminal justice process should
strive to prevent the state from abusing its power, and so might criticize
the criminal justice process if it is ineffective in achieving this goal. It is
equally incorrect to say that it is only the offensive approach that is con-
cerned with “methods,” for while the defensive model may be described as
consisting of principles and procedural safeguards, the virtue of these prin-
ciples and procedural safeguards is deemed to lie in the fact that their
imposition is the method by which abuses of state power are prevented
from occurring. The difference between, on the one hand, the defensive
model and the due process model (insofar as it is based on the prevention
of abuse of state power) and, on the other hand, the offensive approach is
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131. Id. at 20. By classical criminal law, Jareborg meant the “kind of criminal law that
began to dominate in the beginning of the 19th century, especially in what could roughly
be described as German- and French-dominated parts of Europe.” Id.
132. Packer, supra note 1, at 173.
133. Id. at 243–44.
134. Id. at 239–40.
135. Jareborg, supra note 111, at 25, 26, 27–28.
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that they disagree on three fundamental questions. The first question asks
what constitutes an abuse of state power. While the defensive and due
process models emphasize the autonomy, liberty, and rights of every indi-
vidual, the offensive approach emphasizes crime prevention, and so is will-
ing to condone more intrusive uses of state power in pursuit of this aim.
This leads it to view the question of what constitutes an abuse of state
power differently. The second question asks what safeguards are necessary
to prevent such abuses from occurring. Both the defensive and due process
models are mindful of the potential for abuse and so insist on strict safe-
guards. The offensive approach, by contrast, regards the state as an ally. Its
benevolent view of state power means that, while the possibility of abuse
is not forgotten, it is willing to entrust the state with wider powers in order
to give it greater leeway in its efforts to tackle crime. The third question
asks whether such safeguards should be enacted if doing so restricts our
pursuit of the apprehension and conviction of offenders. According to the
defensive model and (insofar as it is based on prevention of abuse of state
power) the due process model, all possible steps should be taken to prevent
abuses of state power, even if this places restrictions on the apprehension
and conviction of offenders. The evaluative priorities associated with these
models are constructed on this basis. By contrast, the offensive approach’s
emphasis on crime prevention leads it to reject safeguards which restrict our
pursuit of the apprehension and conviction of offenders.
For example, the due process model maintains that to arrest someone
in order to attempt to compile a case against him/her would amount to an
abuse of state power: “the police should not arrest unless information in
their hands at that time seems likely, subject to the vicissitudes of the liti-
gation process, to provide a case that will result in a conviction.”136 For
many people, however, this is too stringent. They may share the view of
the crime control model, that it will often be necessary to arrest suspects
in order to investigate offenses.137 But this does not mean that they are
willing to tolerate abuses of state power. Rather, their different priorities
lead them to adopt a different view of what constitutes an abuse, which in
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136. Packer, supra note 1, at 190.
137. The crime control model argues that since “the best source of information is usually
the suspect himself,” the police should not “be expected to solve crimes by independent
investigation alone.” Id. at 187. They should therefore be able to “interrogate the suspect in
private before he has a chance to fabricate a story or to decide that he will not cooperate.”
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turn leads to a different view of what safeguards are necessary to prevent
(what they regard as) abuses from occurring.
Similarly, one of the defensive model’s procedural safeguards is the placing
of the burden of proof on the prosecutor. In In re Winship, the Supreme Court
held that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution “protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”138 Many would
agree with this description, urging that it should always be for the state to
prove the guilt of a person suspected of having committed an offense. The
power and resources of the state are immense in comparison to individuals,
and to presume that those prosecuted for an offense are guilty would place an
oppressive burden on defendants and considerable power in the hands of
those who decide on prosecution. However, others would say that to
always prohibit the state from placing the burden of proof on defendants
is too inflexible. Some matters may be far easier for one party to prove
than the other (e.g., possession of a license), or it may simply be more
expedient to require the defendant to disprove an element of the offense
than to require the prosecution to prove it. The Supreme Court’s accept-
ance that a defendant may constitutionally bear the burden of proving an
affirmative defense139 illustrates that not all agree that the prosecutor
should invariably bear the burden of proof.140
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Id. The length of time for which the suspect may be held is “the length of time, given all
the circumstances, during which it is reasonable to suppose that legitimate techniques of
interrogation may be expected to produce useful information or that extrinsic investiga-
tion may be expected to produce convincing proof either of the suspect’s innocence or of
his guilt.” Id. at 188.
138. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Per Justice Brennan, on behalf of a majority
of the Court.
139. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
140. In a similar vein, the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that article 6(2),
which enshrines the presumption of innocence, does not prohibit the reversal of the burden
of proof, provided that reverse onus provisions are “[confined] within reasonable limits which
take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence.”
Salabiaku v. France, 13 E.H.R.R. 379, ¶ 28 (1988). See also Andrew Ashworth & Meredith
Blake, The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law, [1996] Crim. L.R. 306 (find-
ing that 40 percent of offenses triable in the Crown Court in England and Wales place a bur-
den of proof on the defendant). This is in spite of Lord Sankey LC’s celebrated description of
the presumption of innocence as the “golden thread” of English criminal law. Woolmington
v. DPP, [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.).
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To take one final example from the jurisprudence of the House of
Lords, another of the defensive model’s procedural safeguards is the pro-
hibition on retroactive application of law to the detriment of the accused.
While many would agree that such a prohibition is an important restraint,
there are others who would argue that the state should have the power to
apply law retroactively if and when the necessity arises. In the controver-
sial case R. v. R.,141 their Lordships held that the pronouncement of Sir
Matthew Hale in 1736142 that a husband could not be guilty of raping his
wife had ceased to apply, and so upheld the conviction of the defendant
for the rape of his wife. A number of different interpretations of this deci-
sion are possible: that the House of Lords did not apply the law retrospec-
tively at all; that the House of Lords’ decision was a reasonably foreseeable
step in the evolution of the law; or that the House of Lords usurped
Parliament’s role by abolishing the marital rape exception.143 The impor-
tant point for present purposes is to notice how contentious the question
whether the House of Lords’ verdict represented an abuse of state power
is. How one answers this question will depend not only on how one
interprets the decision itself, but also, for example, on whether one
regards it as an abuse to afford a reasonably foreseeable development in
the law retrospective effect.
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141. R. v. R., [1992] 1 A.C. 599.
142. 1 Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 629 (1st ed. 1736).
143. Their Lordships did not consider themselves to be applying the law retrospectively,
with Lord Keith (with the unanimous support of the House) declaring that “in modern
times the supposed marital exemption in rape forms no part of the law of England.” R. v. R.,
[1992] 1 A.C. 599, 623. The difficulty with this reasoning is that “the [House of Lords] did
not hold that Hale had misstated the law . . . but that (this must have been on some
unspecified day before R had forcible intercourse with his wife in October 1989) the law
had changed as no longer compatible with modern conditions.” David Ormerod, Smith
& Hogan Criminal Law: Cases & Materials 728 (9th ed. 2006). Although the European
Court of Human Rights subsequently declined to find that the decision violated article 7
E.C.H.R., it is submitted that the decision went beyond what the Strasbourg Court
described as “evolution, which was consistent with the very essence of the offence.” SW
and CR v. United Kingdom, 21 E.H.R.R. 363 ¶ 41 (1996). However distasteful one finds
it, before the House of Lords’ decision the exception for marital rape existed (albeit sub-
ject to some erosion in previous cases). After the decision it ceased to exist. The definition
of rape had thus been rewritten. See also R. v. C. (Barry), [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 292
(convicting C in 2002 of raping his wife in 1970, at which time they were married).
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C. Equality
Racial discrimination formed no part of Packer’s outline of the principle
of equality. But he did not overlook this issue—to have done so would
have been quite a stark omission given Packer’s strong personal views144
and the fact that The Limits of the Criminal Sanction was written against
the backdrop of the struggle over civil rights. Instead he dealt with it as
one example of how the state can abuse its power.145 As this demonstrates,
there is some overlap between the principles of prevention of abuse of state
power and equality, in that it is an abuse for the state to unjustifiably dis-
criminate against particular (groups of ) people. But the state may also
abuse its power without being guilty of unjustifiable discrimination. And
abuse of state power is not the only reason that people may not be treated
equally. Packer, for example, applied the principle of equality to an issue
which is not caused by abuse of state power—financial inability. The two
principles should, therefore, be dealt with separately.
George Fletcher commented, “[e]quality is at once the simplest and the
most complex idea that shapes the evolution of the law.”146 As this indi-
cates, how the principle of equality should be applied is contentious.
What is clear, however, is that equality of treatment in the criminal justice
process cannot mean uniformity of treatment; suspects cannot all be
investigated by the same officers, tried by the same judge and jury, and
represented by the same counsel. Packer’s decision to concentrate the due
process model’s application of the principle of equality on financial
(in)ability was based on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Illinois that “there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.”147 So, for example, the due process
model argues that, since there is a large class of persons who cannot afford
any bail payment, “a system that makes pre-trial freedom conditional on
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144. George Packer recalls that his father felt strongly about racial discrimination: “I
was fairly alert to the plight of Negroes; the subject was much discussed in our house, in
strong moral tones. I gathered that Negroes had been treated unfairly and we owed them
something.” Packer, supra note 52, at 238.
145. See Packer, supra note 1, at 180 (outlining the due process model’s perspective on
the police’s power of arrest); id. at 239–46 (commenting on the apparent trend towards the
due process model).
146. George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought 121 (1996).
147. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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financial ability is discriminatory.”148 And it asserts that the right of appeal
must not be restricted by financial inability: “[i]f the appellant cannot
afford to pay a filing fee, it must be waived; if he cannot afford to buy a
transcript, it must be given to him; if he cannot afford to hire a lawyer, he
must be assigned one.”149
These propositions are clearly contentious. The proponent of the crime
control model, for example, views financial ability as a fundamental aspect
of the bail system. Being able to set bail at a level that the defendant can-
not afford enables the magistrate to “select those people who—for what-
ever reason—ought not to be at liberty pending trial, and to see to it that
they are not.”150 On the right of appeal, the crime control model states that
the costs of filing an appeal, buying a transcript, and having legal repre-
sentation should only be waived/defrayed if “the appeal is screened and
determined to be probably meritorious.”151 While this places a limit on the
exercise of the right of appeal by the financially unable, it is deemed to be
sufficient to satisfy the demands of equality. It might even be argued that
to waive/defray these costs for the financially unable, but to impose them
on the financially able, is in itself discriminatory, for it attaches a cost to
the exercise of the right for some but not for others.
The features of the due process model that are derived from the prin-
ciple of equality comprise an ideal-type in the weak sense. They may be
used in empirical work. By comparing these features to reality, they can be
used to analyze the extent to which the criminal justice process reflects the
liberal approach to the concern that justice is not dependent upon finan-
cial ability. And they may also be used in evaluative work. But, for the rea-
sons explained previously, before the features of the due process model
that are based on the principle of equality can be employed as evaluative
standards, their usage in this way must be justified. The researcher must
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148. Packer, supra note 1, at 217.
149. Id. at 231.
150. Id. at 213. The difference of opinion fundamentally flows from the fact that the due
process model holds that there should be a right to pre-trial liberty pending a formal adju-
dication of guilt, id. at 215, whereas the crime control model argues that, since a formal
charge “has behind it a double assurance of reliability” (the judgment of the police officer
and the prosecutor), then “[f ]or all practical purposes, the defendant is a criminal,” and so
there “is no reason for him to go free.” Id. at 211.
151. Id. at 229.
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not only justify invoking the principle of equality, but also explain why
the features of the due process model which are based on the principle of
equality are suitable norms for evaluating whether suspects are treated
equally, particularly since there will almost always be debate over what the
principle of equality requires in a given situation. Furthermore, the scope
of the inquiry must be delineated. For example, Packer’s due process
model only applies the principle of equality to financial (in)ability, and so
may only be used to evaluate the extent to which equal justice depends on
money. Equality may also be a concern in other areas, such as race or gen-
der, and an inquiry along these lines would require another set of evalua-
tive standards.
When expounding his own theoretical framework for evaluating the
criminal justice process, Andrew Ashworth commented that Packer’s two
models are “unsatisfactory in their failure to propose any normative or
evaluative criteria.”152 As we have seen, however, Packer’s purpose in this
part of his book was to demonstrate that the criminal justice process in the
United States was moving towards the due process model.153 In other words,
he was engaged in empirical work, not evaluative work. Furthermore, as has
been explained, the features of the due process model based on the values of
prevention of abuse of state power and equality could be employed as eval-
uative criteria, if their use in this way was first of all justified. Packer did not
embark on this task because he was engaged in an empirical study, but if it
were to be undertaken the result would be a set of evaluative standards. The
distance between Packer’s models and Ashworth’s proposed normative
framework is thus not as great as it at first appears.
D. Crime Prevention
Packer stated that the proposition “the repression of criminal conduct is
by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal
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152. Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study 29 (2d ed. 1998).
Cf. Ashworth & Redmayne, supra note 27.
153. See supra note 129. When Packer arrived at this conclusion, he qualified it by say-
ing, “[i]n theory at least.” Packer, supra note 1, at 239. This presumably alludes to the pos-
sible disparity between the “law in the books” and the “law in action.” Like the due
process/crime control dichotomy, the dichotomy between the “law in the books” and the
“law in action” has been challenged by Doreen McBarnet. McBarnet, supra note 32.
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process”154 underlies the crime control model. However, closer examination
reveals that the features of the crime control model are not contingent
upon the belief that repressing criminal conduct is the most important
function of the criminal process. Although the crime control model insists
that the work of administrative fact finders be given “special weight,” with
“as few restrictions as possible” being placed on it,155 this need not stem
from a concern to repress crime. Someone who shares the crime control
model’s confidence in administrative fact finding will not only regard the
potential for abuse of power as slight,156 but will also view the police/pros-
ecutorial screening process as the best available opportunity to obtain pro-
bative evidence which will help secure a reliable determination of legal
guilt. Nor need the crime control model’s insistence on operational effi-
ciency in the post-screening part of the process157 be motivated by a belief
that primacy should be attached to the repression of crime. Managerialist
concerns would also suggest that if the police/prosecutorial screening
process is a reliable indicator of legal guilt, the operational efficiency of the
post-screening process should be increased so as to avoid an unnecessary
duplication of resources. This reasoning is consistent with the analysis
presented in part III of this article. The investigative and operational
efficiency ideal-types were constructed by accentuating the features of
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154. Packer, supra note 1, at 158.
155. Id. at 162. For example, the crime control model insists that the police should have
extremely broad powers of arrest since “the dictates of police efficiency” provide sufficient
regulation, and that access to a lawyer should be refused because “it is absolutely necessary
for the police to question the suspect at this point without undue interference.” Id. at 177,
202.
156. The crime control model asserts, for example, that “the innocent have nothing to
fear” from broad police powers of arrest, since the dictates of efficiency are sufficient reg-
ulation, and that “[l]aw-abiding citizens have nothing to fear” from electronic surveillance
since “law enforcement has neither the time nor the inclination to build up files of infor-
mation about activity that is not criminal.” Id. at 196.
157. For example, it takes a restrictive view of pre-trial liberty because “[t]he vast
majority of persons charged with crime are factually guilty. . . . Just because the assem-
bly line cannot move fast enough for him to be immediately disposed of is no reason for
him to go free.” Id. at 211. It also encourages guilty pleas because “[i]f the earlier stages
of the process have functioned as they should” there should be only a very small num-
ber of cases in which there is “genuine doubt about the factual guilt of the defendant.”
Id. at 222.
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the crime control model to their purest form. Yet neither ideal-type pur-
ports to attach primacy to the repression of criminal conduct. Instead,
both are premised on administrative fact finders having perfect investiga-
tive efficiency. Since there is no necessary connection between the features
of the crime control model and the belief that the criminal process should
attach primacy to the repression of criminal conduct, the crime control
model is not apt to be used to analyze the extent to which the criminal
process reflects this belief.
By contrast, crime prevention is at the heart of the offensive approach.
However, it is important to recognize that the offensive approach focuses
on one particular strategy for achieving crime prevention. Six of the nine
methods listed by Jareborg concern criminalization, concentrating on an
increased willingness to use the criminal sanction in ways that are broader
and more severe.158 Its focus is thus on the work of legislators, with the
threat of penal sanctions forming their chief weapon.159 So while a
researcher might wish to analyze the extent to which contemporaneous
criminal law policy resembles the offensive approach by comparing the
criminal justice process to the methods and consequences Jareborg identi-
fied, he or she should remember that the fact that current criminal law
policy does not resemble the offensive approach does not mean that crime
prevention is not a priority. It might be that a different crime prevention
strategy is being employed. 
This also has implications for the use of the offensive approach in eval-
uative work.160 A researcher might seek to evaluate legislation by assessing
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158. These six methods are: a threat against or a violation of a legitimate interest of value
is regarded as a sufficient reason for criminalization; so too is culpability; emphasis shifts
from offenses against individuals to offenses against the state machinery or an anonymous
public; criminalizations increasingly concern potentially dangerous deeds or deeds which
are peripheral to caused harm; crime definitions are linguistically indeterminate; and
decriminalizations are rare. Jareborg, supra note 111, at 26.
159. The other three methods could also be employed by legislators: severer legislation
can increase repression within the criminal justice process, criminal procedure can be
rationalized through new legislation, and legislators can encourage the demonization of
offenders.
160. Jareborg himself makes it clear that he opposes the offensive approach. Jareborg,
supra note 111, at 32–33. As a result, much of his description of the offensive approach is at
least impliedly critical. A proponent of the offensive approach would describe its methods
and consequences quite differently.
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the extent to which it employs the methods of the offensive approach.161
However, such evaluation will be impoverished if the researcher does not
first of all do three things. First, grounds must be given for believing that
crime will be prevented if the methods of the offensive approach are
employed. Second, attempting to tackle crime in the manner envisaged by
the offensive approach, rather than in some other way, must be justified.
And third, where attaching primacy to repressing criminal conduct raises
issues relating to other values, this primacy must be justified. This might
involve the researcher justifying the view that seeking to tackle crime in
this particular way does not constitute an abuse of state power, justifying
the view that safeguards which others regard as necessary to prevent abuses
of state power from occurring are in fact unnecessary, and/or the
researcher justifying the view that safeguards that are conceded would
have some value in helping to prevent abuses of state power would
nonetheless be an unjustified restriction on the pursuit of the apprehen-
sion and conviction of offenders. Alternatively (or additionally), it might
involve the researcher justifying the view that seeking to tackle crime in
this particular way is not at odds with the demands of the value of equal-
ity, or the researcher justifying the view that the demands of the value of
equality are insufficient to warrant qualifying the pursuit of the appre-
hension and conviction of offenders.
V.  CONCLUS ION
Any analysis or evaluation of criminal justice policy will be flawed without
a detailed appreciation of the way that competing policies are constructed
and assessed. This article has accordingly warned against an indiscriminate
use of the word “model” to describe the different tools which may be
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161. A proponent of the offensive approach might also carry out evaluation by study-
ing the effect a piece of legislation has on the crime level. However, the fact that crime lev-
els are unaffected does not necessarily mean that the legislation in some way fails to employ
the methods of the offensive approach. For example, it might be because inadequate
resourcing has hampered the enforcement of the legislation, or because there has been a
lack of enthusiasm amongst enforcement agencies for the legislation. Note too that, even
if crime levels were to fall, it does not follow that the new legislation is responsible. It
would have to be shown that the reduction was caused by the new legislation as opposed
to some other factor(s).
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employed in criminal justice research. It has distinguished three separate
tools: strong ideal-types, weak ideal-types, and non-ideal-types. A strong
ideal-type is a theoretical construct. It may be used in empirical work for
analysis and exposition, but, since it could not sensibly be regarded as a
prescription of what to exist, is not apt to be used in evaluative work. A
weak ideal-type is also a conceptual construct, but, as well as being used
in empirical work, it may also be employed in evaluative work as an ideal.
A non-ideal-type (such as the offensive approach to criminal law policy) is
not a conceptual construct; it is a description of an actual strategy or
approach. Like a weak ideal-type, it may be used in both empirical and
evaluative work. This article has also shown that the distinct activities of
empirical work and evaluation must be distinguished. In particular, it has
shown that, if a weak ideal-type or a non-ideal-type is to be used in eval-
uative work, its use in this way must first be justified. This involves the
researcher (1) explicating and defending his interpretation of contentious
concepts, (2) demonstrating that the provisions that he supports are not
only capable of achieving their goal but are also to be preferred to other
possible methods of doing so, and, (3) where enacting the provision
involves imposing/removing restrictions on our efforts to apprehend 
and convict offenders, justifying the imposition/removal of these restric-
tions. If the use of a weak ideal-type or a non-ideal-type as an ideal is not
justified in this way, the result will be an impoverished approach to the
consideration of policy which fails to take responsibility for its own
judgment.
In addition, it is also possible to abstract from the foregoing discussion
two other general lessons for criminal justice research. First, this article has
demonstrated that criminal justice policy cannot be satisfactorily under-
stood if the analytical framework used is a spectrum. A spectrum such as the
one Packer purported to create is a one-dimensional device. It states that
there are two sets of values which are polar opposites, and that as adherence
to one set of values increases so adherence to the other set necessarily dimin-
ishes. It has been shown, however, that the challenge in criminal justice pol-
icy is not to balance the competing demands of two value systems; it is to
balance the competing demands of many different values. The analytical
framework employed must therefore be multidimensional. Second, the ana-
lytical framework employed must have regard for the different ways in
which values are held. A simple “yes/no” approach—either a value is a pri-
ority or it isn’t—is inadequate. Such an approach fails to recognize that
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many values are contentious. One person’s view of what a particular value
requires might not be the same as that of other people. Moreover, there
might be differences over how best to meet the demands of a value. The
“yes/no” approach also obscures the fact that a person might identify as pri-
orities a number of values which, on occasion, conflict. In particular, a value
may still be a priority even if its demands are not always met.
Packer’s exposition of the crime control and due process models is
infested by a failure to appreciate the way that competing policies are con-
structed and assessed. He failed to distinguish between strong and weak
ideal-types and between empirical work and evaluative work, he advocat-
ed the use of a spectrum an as analytical framework, and he employed a
simple “yes/no” approach to describe the packages of values held by dif-
ferent parties within the criminal justice process. Explaining how Packer
committed each of these errors provides a useful way of summarizing the
various arguments that have been advanced. We will work through them
in reverse order.
First, Packer (purportedly) constructed his two models by dichotomiz-
ing the various values competing for priority in the American criminal
process into two separate value systems. He thus adopted a yes/no approach
to these values—certain values could be attributed to the due process
model and not the crime control model, and vice versa. Ironically, Packer
himself appeared to concede the inadequacy of this approach. As part II
explained, he outlined certain rule of law concerns which constitute “com-
mon ground” between his models, thus undermining his assertion that the
crime control model insists on the value of efficiency to the exclusion of the
values associated with the due process model. This article has shown how
this simple yes/no approach to values blights Packer’s work.
Packer ascribed the value of reliability to the due process model. Yet it
has little part to play in his application of the due process model to the
police/prosecutorial screening process; other values are not only given
greater prominence than, but are also given priority over, the demands of
reliability. He also suggested that it is of only secondary importance to the
crime control model, even though this model attaches great significance to
the value of reliability in the police/prosecutorial screening process, insist-
ing that administrative fact finders should be allowed to work unhindered.
And although Packer states that the crime control model demands short-
cuts around reliability in order to increase operational efficiency, we have
seen that it is in fact the case that the crime control model premises its
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demand for operational efficiency upon the police/prosecutorial screening
process operating reliably.
The second value which Packer ascribed to the due process model is
prevention of abuse of state power. According to this model, “the criminal
process must . . . be subjected to controls that prevent it from operating
with maximal [operational] efficiency”; the model would happily accept “a
substantial diminution in the [operational] efficiency with which the
criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official oppression
of the individual.”162 The implication is that the crime control model, with
its insistence that “primary attention be paid to the efficiency with which
the criminal process operates,”163 refuses to impose any such controls upon
the criminal justice process. It is, however, too simplistic to say that the
crime control model subjugates the concern to prevent abuses of state
power to the dictates of efficiency in this way. For a start, it is at odds with
the so-called “common ground” between the models. Moreover, propo-
nents of the crime control model view state power with greater benevo-
lence than the due process model, and so do not share the latter’s liberal
concerns. This means that they are happy to afford greater leeway to the
state and that they have different views on the prior question of what con-
stitutes an abuse of state power. For Packer to assert that the crime control
model subordinates the need to prevent abuses of state power to the dic-
tates of efficiency is to mistakenly assume that there is uniform under-
standing on both sides of what safeguards are necessary to prevent abuses
of state power from occurring and what constitutes an abuse of state power.
The value of equality, the final value Packer attributed to the due
process model, may also be understood in diverse ways. The due process
model applies the principle to the issue of financial (in)ability. What is
required to ensure that financial ability does not affect the “kind of trial a
man gets”164 is also contentious; the level of intervention that the due
process model considers necessary is greater than that deemed necessary by
the crime control model. This is not to say, however, that the due process
model attaches greater significance to the value of equality than the crime
control model. Rather the two models have different views on what is suf-
ficient to prevent discrimination on the basis of financial ability.
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Packer attributed the value of efficiency to the crime control model,
and said that the due process model rejects “absolute efficiency” if it
“demands short-cuts around reliability.”165 This statement on the role of
efficiency is misleading, however, due to Packer’s failure to distinguish,
and clarify the roles of, three different forms of efficiency. The first of
these, investigative efficiency, is welcomed not only by the crime control
model, but also—with its emphasis on reliability—by the due process
model. The second form of efficiency is the deterrent efficacy of the crim-
inal law. This form of efficiency is not in competition with the demands
of reliability—on the contrary, it is dependent upon it. General awareness
that the criminal justice process is unreliable will lead to a decrease in the
deterrent efficacy of the criminal law. It is the third form of efficiency,
operational efficiency, that the due process model rejects when it demands
shortcuts around reliability. The crime control model, however, does not
insist on the expeditious handling of cases at the expense of reliability. Its
demand for operational efficiency in the post-screening part of the process
is premised upon its faith in the police/prosecutorial screening process;
according to the crime control model operational efficiency is only a sus-
tainable ideal if the administrative fact finding processes have investigative
efficiency.
Packer stated that the goal of the crime control model is the repression
of crime. We have seen, however, that the features of the model are in fact
shaped by its great confidence in administrative fact finding, and that
someone who shares this confidence might agree with the features of the
model even if his or her primary concern is not the repression of crime. 
The simple yes/no approach proves to be a defective foundation for the
analytical framework which Packer built upon it. It obscures the fact that
Packer’s due process model identifies as priorities values which, on occa-
sion, conflict. It also means that there is no scope within Packer’s frame-
work for examining whether different opinions over a policy decision
emanate from different views of what a particular value requires. Suppose,
for example, a decision is made to repeal a provision which the due process
model regards as essential to prevent the abuse of state power. According
to Packer’s framework the reason for the decision against the values of the
due process model must be a concern for efficiency and crime prevention.
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But this is too simplistic.166 It could be the case that those in favor of the
decision have different views either on what constitutes an abuse of state
power or on what is necessary to prevent such an abuse from occurring. In
their eyes the provision might be an unnecessary restriction upon the
power of the state, one which could potentially hinder efforts to achieve
other goals. Any analysis that ignores this, and explains the decision sim-
ply as an example of the values of efficiency and crime prevention being
given priority over preventing abuses of state power, will be distorted.
Packer’s second error was to advocate the use of a spectrum to analyze the
criminal process. We have seen that a spectrum is inadequate as an analytical
tool. The challenge in criminal justice policy is to balance the competing
demands of many different values, and so the analytical framework employed
must be multidimensional. The spectrum Packer purported to construct
reduces all policy decisions to a conflict between two value systems—those of
the crime control and due process models. This one-dimensional approach
leads to the mistaken assumption that any policy decision which is based
upon the values of one model must necessarily have a detrimental effect upon
the values of the other model. But this is not the case. Suppose, for example,
that a decision is made which increases the operational efficiency of the post-
screening part of the criminal justice process. Packer’s spectrum tells us that
the reliability of the process as a whole must have been diminished. But to
say this is to simply assume that the post-screening part of the process ought
to be devoted to reliability without examining first the police/prosecutorial
screening process. It might be the case that the reliability of the whole process
has not been adversely affected at all. The one-dimensional approach also
leads to the mistaken assumption that any decision which detrimentally
affects one of the values Packer associated with the due process model must
be motivated by a concern for the values he attributed to the crime control
model. But such a decision might not be based on the values he associated
with the crime control model. For example, a decision which reduces the
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two flaws in such reasoning. First, since they do not regard the provision as essential to pre-
vent abuses of state power, those making the decision would not, in their eyes, be prioritiz-
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obtain probative evidence which leads to reliable determinations of guilt.
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reliability of the criminal justice process in order to prevent abuses of state
power, or to achieve greater equality, would not be concerned with the values
associated with the crime control model at all.
Finally, Packer’s work fails to clearly distinguish between strong and weak
ideal-types and between empirical work and evaluative work. Although
Packer’s aim was to construct something like ideal-types, he failed in this
task by not accentuating the viewpoints of either of his models to their
purest form. Part III of this article succeeded where Packer failed, by con-
structing four ideal-types—the operational efficiency, investigative efficiency,
adversarial reliability and administrative reliability ideal-types—based on
the values of operational efficiency, investigative efficiency and reliability.
The factual premises upon which the first three of these ideal-types are based
mean that they are ideal-types in the strong sense. Packer’s objective appears
to have been to construct strong ideal-types, since he stated that his models
could not plausibly be regarded as goals to strive towards, describing anyone
who subscribed to the values of one model to the exclusion of the values of
the other as a “fanatic.”167 However, this statement obscures the fact that, to
the extent that it is based upon the principles of prevention of abuse of 
state power and equality, the due process model is an ideal-type in the weak
sense. The features of the model derived from these two principles may not
only be used in empirical work, but could also be used as evaluative
standards. Packer thus obscured the necessity of justifying the use of these
features as evaluative standards before engaging in evaluative work.
Although, after decades of critical scrutiny, Herbert Packer’s attempt to
devise a theoretical framework for analyzing criminal justice policies may
not exert the influence it once held, there remain lessons to be learned
through exploring the fundamental approach to modeling criminal justice
policy pioneered by Packer. First, a distinction must be drawn between the
different tools which may be used to analyze criminal justice policies
(strong ideal-types, weak ideal-types, non-ideal-types) and between the
activities of empirical work and evaluation. Second, since the challenge in
criminal justice policy is to balance the demands of many competing val-
ues, a multidimensional analytical framework must be used. Third, the
simple yes/no approach to describing the ways in which different values
are held must be abandoned. By paying attention to these lessons, a fuller
understanding of criminal justice policy can be achieved.
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